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ABSTRACT 
Emergency management coordination in the United States has fallen victim to over a 
century of strategies to organize, reorganize, consolidate, or decentralize disaster preparedness, 
planning and response. Regardless of the agency in charge at the federal level, individual citizens 
have been responsible for their own well-being immediately after any disaster or emergency 
event for more than 100 years because it takes time to mobilize and deliver aid. The system most 
often charged with managing that mobilization during an emergency event that exceeds the 
response capacity of local public safety agencies is the state emergency management network. 
Many entities in a state emergency management network have different responsibilities during 
disaster states vs. non-disaster states. Regardless of their role and function, entities need to be 
able to exchange resources and information with each other, often under time, economic, or other 
constraints during disasters. This resource exchange generates trust, an essential element of a 
resilient network. Resilient networks suffer fewer negative impacts from disaster related loss and 
are more likely to retain collective capacity to respond and help communities recover. 
“The purpose of this study is to explore the ability of individual and state level attributes 
to explain variability in perception of network resilience.   One-hundred fifty one state 
emergency management agency employees were surveyed regarding their perception of 5 
constructs of network resilience (rapidity, redundancy, relationships, resourcefulness, and 
robustness) and individual level attributes. State level indicators from FEMA, NEMA, 
American Human Development Index, and Social Vulnerability Index were also analyzed.  
Overall, it was found that the individual attribute of perception of network integrity had 
the most influence on perception of network resilience, followed by perception of community 
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resilience and state level attributes including disaster experience, state well-being, and number of 
full time state emergency management agency employees. These findings can improve network 
resilience by informing state emergency management network development activity. Networks 
that increase member opportunities to develop relationships of resource and information 
exchange will increase their resilience.  That increased network resilience impacts community 
resilience because, as Winston Churchill’s wise words during World War II reconstruction 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The evening news is rarely without devastating imagery of a hurricane, earthquake, 
tornado, or wildfire somewhere in the world. While recent media coverage has reported horrific 
loss from China to Haiti, the top 10 most expensive world-wide disasters in the last 110 years 
have all occurred in the United States within the last two decades, with a total economic impact 
for all U.S. disasters between 1991 and 2005 estimated at over 365 billion dollars (UN/ISDR, 
n.d.). In the United States, the number of presidential disaster declarations increased from 162 in 
the decade between 1956 and 1965 to 597 in the decade between 2001 and 2010 (FEMA, 2012). 
These escalating costs come during a period of corresponding economic distress, placing ever 
increasing strain on federal, state, and local emergency response agencies.  
Given the rising number of disaster declarations and the costs associated with them, it is 
timely to explore the potential for new strategies to reduce community vulnerability and decrease 
the cost of these impacts. Improving disaster management efficiency and effectiveness requires 
strategies that offer better organization, more concerted effort, and substantial reallocation of 
resources (Alexander, 2006). One promising strategy to improve emergency management 
organization and efficiency is to employ the tried and true business adage “Use the right people 
for the right job”. The government level that has the “right people” to provide an emergency 
function is the level that has [access to] appropriate equipment and sufficient management 
capacity while still being close to the ground and in the midst of the emergency event (Haddow 
& Bullock, 2006). In the United States, this is often the state government level, where officials 
can draw information and intelligence down from larger national sources and coordinate the 
mobilization of personnel and equipment at local levels. State emergency management agencies 
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are positioned to be the most efficient nexus of coordination, communication, and exchange 
between localities and state and federal emergency management resources. In light of the 
increasing incidence of disaster declarations in the United States and increasing costs associated 
with each response, it is imperative that more efficient use of available resources be explored.  
Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) suggest that a critical governance priority is the need to reconcile 
outmoded vertical tools of authority with horizontal tools of action, like networks.  
This research is predicated on the assumption that development of network resilience is a 
viable strategy to reduce community vulnerability. Improved network performance is purported 
to reduce the negative impacts of disaster events by decreasing community risk, increasing 
community resilience and increasing state emergency network capacity to both respond and help 
communities recover. This purpose of this study is to explore individual and state level 
predictors of network resilience to inform that process. Specific aims of the study include: 
• Aim 1: To determine if network resilience is validly measured by the constructs of 
redundancy, rapidity, resourcefulness, robustness and relationships. 
• Aim 2: To determine if specific individual level indicators can predict perception of 
emergency management network resilience.  
• Aim 3: To determine if specific state level indicators can predict perception of state 
emergency management network resilience. 
• Aim 4: To determine if state level variables are more influential than individual-level 
variables in explaining the variability in perceived emergency network resilience. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Organizing is what you do before you do something,  
so that when you do it, it is not all mixed up. – A.A. Milne 
 
The United States Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as a direct and 
immediate response to the terrorist plane attacks on September 11, 2001 that killed almost 3,000 
people in three coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and an in-air flight that 
crashed in a Pennsylvania field (Glazier, 2008). The Act created the Department of Homeland 
Security, a massive organization composed of 22 previously disparate agencies that was charged 
with oversight of domestic terrorism defense and coordination of a cohesive network of disaster 
response capabilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) became one of the 
22 absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), reflecting a commitment to 
coordinate national emergency management efforts that was reflected in the publication of the 
National Response Plan in 2004 and a companion guidance document, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). That plan became the foundational document for the more 
expansive National Response Framework in place today. NIMS was designed to provide a 
common operating approach to incident management and encourage collaboration and 
cooperation among governments, departments, and agencies but a fundamental power struggle 
rendered the framework ineffective and the hurricane response a fiasco. In response to the failure 
of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) during Hurricane Katrina, there have been 
calls for more centralized disaster response in the federal government (Lester & Krejci, 2007).   
After 9/11, budgets for defense-related agencies sky-rocketed: Homeland Security’s 
discretionary budget jumped from about $16 billion in 2002 to more than $43 billion in 2011. 
Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration and Border Patrol have also more than 
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doubled since 2001 (DHS, 2012). Despite these increasing funding commitments, national 
efforts to coordinate emergency planning, preparedness and response efforts were still suffering 
from significant failures of governance (Senate Report, 2006; House Report, 2006).  
These failures were epically demonstrated during the response to Hurricane Katrina, four 
years after 9/11.  Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans, LA at class 5 strength, 
impacting 90,000 square miles and leaving over 1,800 people dead (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2010; National Research Council, 2007). Damage estimates from 
Hurricane Katrina top $80 billion with a total economic impact assessed at more than $150 
billion (National Research Council, 2007). After action analyses of the event revealed that every 
level of government demonstrated inadequate institutional capacity to manage the response. 
Specifically, the newly structured DHS was untested and uncertain about how to deploy its 
authority and resources. Key functions, political influence, and resources of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had weakened under the leadership of Bush 
administration political appointees (Moynihan, 2009).  
Hurricane Katrina was a storm of massive proportion with devastating impacts to show 
for it. Any improvement actions determined to increase response capacity and decrease 
community vulnerability to events the size of Katrina will surely be robust enough to contain the 
vast majority of disaster events, as the most will be much less devastating in scope and scale. 
Research suggests that action based on traditional leadership tools like silo/centralized command 
and control, resource allocation and funding distribution do not adequately support post-disaster 
community resiliency and recovery (Gopalakrishnan & Okada, 2007). In fact, traditional 
leadership tools may not be best suited to guide action to reduce the risks or improve 
vulnerability in the mitigation or preparedness phases of the emergency cycle, either. This work 
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may be better accomplished by teams who can engage in rapid reflection to make sense of a 
fundamentally reordered landscape, and who can seek new approaches rather than learned 
responses that do not fit (Lagadec, 2008). These teams, as a collective set of crisis responders, 
should be considered as a network, with varying degrees of connectivity (Moynihan, 2008).  
Need for the Study 
 Alexander suggests that vulnerability is a greater disaster risk than hazards themselves 
(2006). Although reduction of vulnerability is a human rights issue, risk reduction, which is 
essentially a conversation of economic impact, is not (Sarewitz, Pielke, & Keykhah, 2003). 
Despite the debate around risk and vulnerability and the absence of common set of definitions 
and methods to collect human impact data, the importance of reducing both risk and 
vulnerability is widely acknowledged (Guha-Sapir & Horois, 2012). In 1953, the U.S spent 
approximately $0.13 per person on disasters ($20.9 million adjusted to 2009 dollars). This 
spending has increased steadily to $4.75 per person in 2009, or $1.4 billion, with many more 
disaster declarations (National Academies, 2012).  
The key to reducing community disaster vulnerability and building resilient communities 
is the development of participatory networks that facilitate trust and exchange. Shared goals and 
common experiences engender a sense of trust between individuals and organizations. Increased 
trust encourages resource and information exchange. This exchange builds resilience throughout 
the community as relationships develop and adaptive capacities are shared, increasing the speed, 
redundancy, robustness, and resourcefulness of the network as a whole (Bruneau et al, 2003).  
According to Kapucu, building trust among public, private, and nonprofit organizations 
can best be done prior to emergency situations (2006). The stronger a local government’s pre-
6 
disaster relationships with other local governments, public entities, non-profit organizations and 
businesses, the better prepared it will be to mobilize help and mutual aid when necessary (Smith 
& Reiss, 2006). Increased trust facilitates resource and information exchange and the flow of 
influence (Lin, 1999). More resilient communities use aid more efficiently and effectively after 
disaster, increasing the likelihood of sustainable recovery to pre-disaster function and decreasing 
the economic and intangible costs associated with disaster recovery. 
In recognition of the need for alternative strategies, the US Department of Homeland 
Security requested that the National Research Council form an ad hoc committee to organize a 
two day workshop to discuss the use of social network analysis as a tool to build community 
disaster resilience (Magosino, 2009). This committee planned a workshop to investigate how 
social network analysis could be useful across all phases of the disaster cycle (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, recovery). The workshop invited attendance from experts in resilience 
science and SNA and practitioners in emergency management to discuss how SNA, as a 
governance tool, could be used to increase community resiliency. The workshop summary called 
for innovative research into how social network analysis can be used to build community disaster 
resilience. In response to expert opinion expressed in the workshop acknowledging the necessity 
of reliable baseline data, this research attempts to measure network integrity and resilience and 
explore factors that may influence it. 
Just as it took almost 350 years for the modern calendar to be accepted around the world 
after it was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582, translating even expert research into 
practice can be a drawn out process. According to Stevens, it can take 17 years to turn 14% of 
research to the benefit of patient care (2004). As the Department of Homeland Security found 
when it was challenged to respond to Hurricane Katrina in its organizational infancy, disaster 
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does not wait for convenience. With these trends, is important to invest in research that can 
generate protective action early and consistently regardless of a disaster’s schedule. 
In addition, evaluation of the relationships between disaster history and emergency 
management network resilience and between network resilience and community well-being may 
provide a better understanding of how exchange and trust within state emergency management 
networks can be intentionally developed to improve network resilience and by association, 
community resilience. The more resilient a community, the less vulnerable its residents and 
infrastructure are to disaster impact and the fewer the resources required to recover and rebuild.   
Significance 
Significance of the Problem 
In 2005, the US Congress reported that an investment of one dollar in hazard mitigation 
(disaster preparedness) provides the nation with four dollars in future benefits (Woodworth, 
2006). If the federal government invested just 1% ($210 million) of the more than $21 billion 
spent on disaster relief in 2011 on preparedness, $840 million in benefits could have been 
realized from just that one year alone. With over 1,000 major and emergency presidential 
disaster declarations between 1995-2010, the economics of this alternative investment equation 
becomes almost boggling, especially given that there is a scarcity of research on alternative 
emergency management mitigation and planning/ preparedness strategies.  
Local community network development would be an ideal strategy to pursue as the 
majority of disasters have the heaviest impact at the local level, where communities may be ‘on 
their own’ for the first seventy-two hours after disaster impact (O’Leary, 2004). Unfortunately, 
limited resources and experience often mean the weakest coordination and response capacities 
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are also often found at the local community level. In communities where residents do not have a 
strong capacity to protect and manage their own life safety and property, the impact of 
responding to and recovering from is increased. Without better data to support best practices for 
network development, however, it is economically and strategically unfeasible to focus network 
building strategies at local levels given the unpredictable nature and frequency of disaster and 
emergency events. With fiscal and resource constraints at the local level and the difficult 
challenge of building networks of effective action in dynamic environments like emergency 
response (Kapucu, 2005), networks that self-organize to improve network integrity have the 
potential to do far more to bolster sustainable recovery than any amount of disaster aid applied 
only at response and recovery stages. This study reasons that the state government level of 
emergency management could be the most appropriate sector for network development because 
it can maximize penetration and sustainability of preparedness activities throughout local 
communities. 
Scope of Study 
The objective of this cross sectional factor analysis study was to contribute to the baseline 
knowledge about the characteristics that influence state emergency management network 
resilience as perceived by the management staff. This research surveyed state emergency 
management network employees in 47 U.S. states regarding their perceptions of their state 
network integrity, community resilience, and state emergency management network resilience 
and examined other data sources to measure state ecological variables of disaster experience, 
state well-being, population, emergency management budget, number of full time state 
9 
emergency management employees, FEMA region that may influence the development of 
network resilience in each state. 
The primary goal of this study was to develop a model that explores the influence of 
individual and state level variables on the resilience of state emergency management networks. If 
those variables can be identified, they can be assessed within and across states to build stronger, 
more efficient and effective networks that have an increased capacity to reduce the impact of 
disaster on their state community.  
The primary expected benefit of this research is generation of foundational insight into 
constructs that measure the emerging concept of emergency management network resilience and 
predictors of state emergency management network resilience. Historically, experts have only 
been able to extrapolate this information from expensive after-event experience. A better 
understanding of desirable network characteristics would allow all states to more efficiently 
focus emergency management network development efforts to build partnerships that strengthen 
the network without having to experience the emergencies that historically forge them.  
While measurement of the actual number and quality of exchanges among organizations 
within each state network and/or a network analysis for each state networks would be a direct 
way to validate this assumption, both are beyond the scope of this research and not indicated 
until a better basic understanding of state emergency network resilience is obtained.  
Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature. It outlines a brief history of federal disaster 
response strategy and disaster history in the United States. It also discusses the concepts of 
vulnerability and resilience in disaster before exploring the development of networks as an 
organizational system.  Next, complex adaptive systems theory is offered as a complimentary 
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perspective to guide development for networks of disaster entities. Study aims, hypotheses and a 
structural model are presented. 
 Chapter Three presents the methodology applied in this study. The research design, 
hypotheses, measurement model and structural models are introduced.  Data sources, collection 
and analysis are then discussed.  
 Chapter Four presents the results of the study in 3 sections. The first section, exploratory 
analysis, includes descriptive statistics about the sample at both the individual level and the state 
level. The second section includes discussion of qualitative responses to the researcher 
developed survey tool followed by correlation analysis. The third section, confirmatory analysis, 
summarizes both measurement model and structural model results.  
Chapter Five presents a summary of the study and considers implications, contributions, 
limitations, and conclusions.  Implications are addressed from theoretical, methodological, 
practical and policy perspectives. Contributions at different levels are discussed. Finally, 
conclusions are presented with recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Intensifying impacts of environmental and technological disasters across the world are 
sobering (Reser & Morrissey, 2008). As the human population continues to increase and 
migration toward hazard prone areas like coastlines continues, the social and economic cost of 
natural disasters will continue toward catastrophic levels (Peek & Mileti, 2002). Between 1999 
and 2009, more than 25 million people were affected by disasters with over 5,400 disaster related 
deaths reported in the United States alone (Red Cross, 2009). In 2010, the world saw a collective 
economic impact of over $123 billion, climbing above the 10 year average of $98 billion (Guha-
Sapir, Vos, Below & Ponserre, 2010).  Intentional efforts to design emergency management 
systems to reduce the impact of disasters requires an understanding of what factors influence that 
impact, which of those factors can be influenced and more importantly, how to influence them. 
While the scale of disaster impact is heavily aggravated by vulnerability and mitigated by 
resilience, economic and social science literature agree that outcomes can be impacted by both 
perception and reality of risk including damage to health, quality of life, property, services and 
systems (O’Riordan,1995; Slovic,1997). Toya & Skidmore suggest there is an underlying 
social/economic fabric that can improve the level of safety during disaster (2005). Organizational 
theory research has presented strong support for the premise that organizations, working 
together, can build the capacity of a community to identify and respond to its needs beyond those 
working alone or in competition (Provan et al., 2004).   
The ability of networks to act as a fabric, specifically state emergency management 
networks, to mitigate community vulnerability and strengthen community resilience, is explored 
in this study. This research is designed to explore the impact one governance tool, networking, 
could have on building trust and exchange – two precursors of increased community resilience, a 
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protective factor that inhibits indirect damage. Theoretical foundations of vulnerability and 
resilience science are presented to outline the perspective of this research.  
Impacts of Disasters 
The top 10 most expensive natural disasters between 1980 and 2010 caused over $500 
billion in damage and over 22,000 deaths (Information Institute, 2013). In 2011, the economic 
impact of disaster was estimated at more than $55 billion (National Academies, 2012). While 
exact figures are impossible to confirm, disasters are costly events no matter the cause.  Losses 
are usually underreported because they can be very difficult to identify in the immediate 
aftermath or measure consistently throughout recovery. These staggering numbers drive research 
like this study to better understand ways to minimize those losses, some of which are never 
recovered.   
Kousky suggests the economic costs of (natural) disaster could be considered in two 
categories, direct damages and indirect damages (2012). Direct damage, the destruction done to 
buildings and contents, is the easiest to grasp visually. While quantification of these damages can 
present theoretical challenges around assessed vs. replacement value and can be complicated by 
insurance and government aid payments, there is often an established cost basis to guide 
assessment. Indirect damages are far more difficult to capture because they do not need to be tied 
to direct observed physical damage (Kousky, 2012). An example of an indirect damage by her 
definition might be business interruption attributed to electricity loss due to an event that was 
unrelated to her building. Other indirect damage costs could include a decline in quality of life 
related utility, costly compensation for disaster related issues like longer travel times due to road 
closures or the expense of purchasing battery operated lighting in response to power loss.   
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As difficult as determining direct costs of a disaster can be, accurate estimation of 
indirect costs can be exponentially harder to identify through empirical analysis (Okuyama, 
2008). Indirect effects are hard to verify, difficult to model, can flux in response to the size, 
scope, and geography of the event, and depend on the resilience of the economy and pace of 
recovery (Rose, 2004). Another significant challenge to confident cost measurement is 
identification of the number of response organizations involved in an event. What is not elusive, 
however, is awareness that the cost of disasters is increasingly overwhelming both in terms of 
economic and societal impact. Cost containment can’t be done without better information and 
resource management, something emergency management researchers and professionals are 
working toward every time they navigate the emergency management cycle. 
History of Emergency Management in the US  
Emergency management efforts are divided into four distinct cycle segments by FEMA: 
prevention, mitigation, protection, planning/preparedness, response, and recovery, although 
activity during the response and ensuing recovery phases are usually the most dramatic visible 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  Emergency Management Cycle 
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The preparedness segment includes activities to make ready for hazards that cannot be 
prevented, or mitigated. The response segment includes those activities that are undertaken to 
respond to emergencies when they occur. Activities in the recovery segment reflect work to 
restore the community to its pre-emergency condition. The mitigation segment includes those 
activities that decrease risk by reducing or eliminating the potential for damage and disruption 
from future disasters. This cycle is commonly described as “comprehensive emergency planning 
or management” (CEP or CEM) and, while primarily coordinated by local public agencies, 
works best when a broad range of private actors are included in planning and relief efforts 
(Gazley & Brudney, 2007).  
Direct effort to coordinate federal resources during an emergency began when President 
Truman signed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, authorizing creation the Federal Civil 
Defense Agency in the Office of Emergency Management. Early work of the FDCA attempted to 
create a national plan for fallout sheltering but evolved to address evacuation as a strategic 
priority when confusion over agency goals led to budget constraint by Congress (Blanchard, 
1987). President Eisenhower merged the FDCA with the existing Office of Defense Mobilization 
in 1958 only to see President Kennedy transfer the civil defense functions of the newly conjoined 
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the Secretary of Defense in 1961. The remaining 
functions were performed by the newly designated Office of Emergency Planning, which was 
renamed the Office of Emergency Preparedness in in 1968. Job functions and responsibilities 
were then transferred to the Departments of the Treasury and Housing and Urban Development, 
and to the General Services Administration when the Office of Emergency Planning was 
terminated in 1973 (US Government manual, 1995). 
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In an effort to organize disjointed plans across multiple agencies, President Carter created 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 to consolidate federal disaster 
related responsibilities (FEMA, 2010). Leading FEMA continued to absorb responsibilities from 
its predecessor agencies and from new directives even after its 2003 integration into the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security with 21 other government agencies, where it was 
housed within the Directorate of Preparedness and Response. As agency organizational charts 
evolved, so did planning and response priorities and doctrine. FEMA led development of the 
National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008 to replace both the 2004 National Response Plan 
and its predecessor, the Federal Response Plan of 1992. The NRF describes principles, roles and 
responsibilities, specific authorities and best practices to guide incident management from 
serious local events to large scale national disasters (FEMA, 2013).  
When local, regional and state capacity to respond to an emergency event is exceeded, 
federal resources are coordinated according to the National Response Framework. Emergency 
managers at all levels of preparedness and response refer to the tenets of the National Response 
Framework because they provide a scalable structure to assess, plan, and deliver essential 
capabilities during an emergency response like mass care, operational coordination, and 
transportation.  
Jurisdictional distinction between emergency management agencies and resources is 
usually made between federal, state, and local levels. FEMA region is an important additional 
level to consider in emergency management. FEMA’s mission is ‘to support our citizens and first 
responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain and improve our 
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate all hazards’ 
FEMA, 2012). In an attempt to carry out that mission, FEMA has created 10 geographic regions 
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of service across the United States, each with a regional office of technical experts available to 
support planning, training and exercising efforts of emergency management partners in their 
region. This support is delivered in accordance with three principles of Whole Community 
FEMA identified with stakeholders to move their strategic work away from a government centric 
model and into larger collective emergency management teams, or networks. The principles are  
understand and meet the actual needs of the whole community, engage and empower all parts of 
the community, and strengthen what works well in communities on a daily basis. A map of 
FEMA regions is illustrated in Appendix A. 
While FEMA’s regions encourage standard dissemination of federal policies, states 
within the regions can have very different organizational structures for day-to-day operations of 
their emergency management agencies. State agency structures vary within geographical and 
FEMA regions and can change from year to year, especially when a new state governor takes 
office. In 2010, the state emergency management agency was located within the Governor’s 
office in 9 states and within the Department of Public Safety in 14 states. In 18 states it sits 
within the military department under the direction of the adjutant general. In the remaining 11 
states the agency is located in a combined emergency management/homeland security agency 
(NEMA, 2010).  
Regardless of the sponsoring agency, all states have developed working partnerships, or 
Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, that outline their commitments to provide 
support to each other in advance of a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
response (Kapucu, 2009). This assistance offers provisions for states to share any capability or 
resource they can and ensures a consistent framework to manage reimbursement, liability, and 
workers compensation across states. While EMACs are agreements between state entities, most 
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state emergency management agencies have Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) with 
entities within their own networks that speak to similar assurances, albeit with widely varying 
degrees of complexity and success. 
Regardless of jurisdictional levels (and often in spite of them), Smith and Reiss (2006) 
suggest the stronger a local government’s pre-disaster relationships with other local 
governments, public entities, non-profit organizations and businesses, the better prepared it will 
be to mobilize help and mutual aid when necessary 
While long a staple of emergency management response and recovery, vertical incident 
management frameworks like those that came before the NRF are no longer believed to be the 
best primary tools to facilitate resource coordination and exchange.  Given that these frameworks 
have never been well applied to the mitigation and planning/preparedness phases of the 
emergency management cycle, reliance on conventional centralized chain of command is a thing 
of the past (Gopalakrishnan & Okada, 2007). Frameworks that instead support coordination of 
mitigation and preparedness efforts are essential to effective response and recovery. McEntire et 
al. (2002, p. 276) have suggested the need for a “paradigm shift” in emergency management 
research to put a greater focus on proactive efforts to identify and reduce community 
vulnerabilities, making them more resilient against the negative impacts of disasters and hazard 
events. In this study, respondents were surveyed about the length of time they have worked 
experience in emergency management and in their current agency in an attempt to measure any 
impact these sorts of shifts may have on perception of network resilience. 
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Theoretical Frameworks 
Vulnerability and Resilience  
Reducing the impact of disaster, economic and otherwise, is a critical challenge to protect 
societal well-being. There is general consensus about the importance of risk reduction in 
mitigating the vulnerability of human settlements to natural hazards (Guha-Sapir & Hoyois, 
2012).  Risk research has traditionally focused on strategies to make the economic impacts of 
disaster “less bad”. Vulnerability research, on the other hand, accepts that impacts are affected 
by other social dimensions including class, ethnicity, community structure, community decision 
making processes and political issues (Yodmani, 2001).  More tools exist to measure risk 
reduction than to mitigate vulnerability in the literature because risk is primarily treated as an 
economic measure of impact and as such is more confidently and consistently measured. Burton 
demonstrated a modest inverse relationship between deaths due to natural disasters and income 
for twenty countries in 1973 and 1986 (1993). 
As vulnerability research has grown, the field has developed a more proactive 
understanding of vulnerability reduction as, in essence, another name for economic, 
infrastructure, and social development to inure communities to cope with any disruptive hazard 
activity (Paton, 2008).  Vulnerability science suggests there are two main mechanisms by which 
vulnerability, or “potential for loss” (Cutter, 1996), can be mediated; exposure and sensitivity 
(Adger, 2006; Cutter, 1996; Cutter et al, 2008.) 
The strongest models of vulnerability reduction address both risk of exposure and 
sensitivity. Cuny’s 1983 work focused discussion of a developmental approach to reduce 
vulnerability in disasters in an effort to address the underlying causes of increasing social 
vulnerability like poverty, population, development and environmental degradation (Cutter, 
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1996).  Dwyer et al builds on Birkmann’s 2006 vulnerability reduction model by including 
consideration of resources in the following formula for assessing and preventing risk by reducing 
vulnerability:  Risk = Hazard * (Vulnerability – Resources) where Risk is the probability of loss, 
Hazard is a circumstance or event with a chance of harm, Vulnerability is the extent to which 
persons or things are susceptible to being affected and Resources are those protective assets in 
place that will mitigate the negative impact of the hazard (cited in Flanagan, Gregory, Hallisey, 
Heitfgerd, & Lewis, 2011).  
Cutter’s Hazards of Place model of vulnerability combines biophysical vulnerability 
(physical characteristics of hazards and environment) and social vulnerability to determine an 
overall place vulnerability as a pre-event condition, independent of hazard type, but also 
considers post-event human adjustment (1996). The focus on place is an important aspect of the 
HOP model because it posits that variables that characterize place can be dynamic across space 
and time (Morath, 2010). For example, a place can be at increased risk of experiencing a hazard 
event due to geography, but the community that inhabits the topography can be less vulnerable if 
they are a strong, vibrant, connected society. Those connections imbue the community with 
resilience, a capacity to support themselves and each other in ways that decrease the negative 
impacts after disaster. 
The concept of resilience originated in the field of ecology science, but has been explored 
across a wide diversity of hard and soft science fields including psychology, geography, nursing, 
engineering and systems science (Kulig, 2000; Klein et al., 2003; Manyena, 2006 ). In the 
engineering field, researchers at the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 
Research (MCEER) at the University of Buffalo in New York identified a resilience framework 
with four properties of resilience for physical and organizational systems considered 
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fundamental to reducing the likelihood of failures to critical infrastructure (thereby, reducing the 
impacts of failure) and speeding the time to recovery during disaster (Miles & Chang, 2006). 
Those four indicators, robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity, were the foundation 
for the development of the Perception of Network Resilience Survey tool created for this study.  
In the social sciences, resilience research grew as a result of a shift in psychological 
research from characteristics that contribute to failure to those that facilitate triumph (Norris, 
2008; Polk, 1997). Essayist Brian G. Jett defines resiliency as "the art of learning to repeatedly 
refuse to do anything else other than rise again after any and all set-backs" (2004). Whether as 
art or science, resiliency has been studied as a composite of individual, familial, environmental 
and cultural factors as well as an arrangement of personal and social resources.  
To date, resilience at the individual level has been most heavily explored in psychology, 
juvenile education and justice and social work therapy as character trait of coping and response 
to stressful life events in children, adolescents, adults, and families. Miller (2003) described 
traditional resiliency research as associated with the study of “at-risk” children or adolescents 
who have managed to succeed in life despite having to face serious life challenges.  
With extensive study of over two million youth since 1989, the Search Institute has 
provided ample evidence that building the number of assets present in each individual will 
positively impact healthy development and growth and increase individual resilience. According 
to the Search Institute (2005), their model identifies 20 internal and 20 external developmental 
assets. Assets in the external category identify positive experiences communities can promote in 
their environments to increase individual adolescent resilience including support, clear 
boundaries and expectations, fairness and equity, and competence. While directed toward youth, 
21 
community asset building activities like those encouraged by the Search Institute benefit whole 
communities by association. 
Emerging research into the ability of a community to be resilient has demonstrated little 
consensus around models to date. The studies that do present models are primarily economic loss 
estimation models, and authors acknowledge the inadequacy of that dimension alone to capture 
the essence of resilience in communities (Chang & Shinozuka, 2004). It is probable that lack of 
consensus around valid models is partly due to the complexity of the concept but a challenge 
may well be due to the number of disparate disciplines studying resilience from the perspective 
of their own professional literature with little successful exploration of shared themes. The 
research community has long demonstrated disagreement about the definition of resilience, 
classification of resilience as an outcome or a process, typing resilience (as an economic, 
infrastructure, ecological, or community system), and which policy realm (counterterrorism; 
climate change; emergency management; long-term disaster recovery; environmental restoration) 
it should inform (Cutter, Burton & Emrich, 2010).   
Many definitions of community resilience do, however, share the common theme of 
societal capacity to absorb negative impacts of adverse events and recover to a baseline (or 
better) function.  Community disaster resilience is defined by Renschler et al (2010) as the ability 
of social units (like organizations and communities) to mitigate hazards, limit effects of disasters 
when they occur, and execute recovery activities in ways that lessen social disruption and abate 
the effects of future extreme events. Ben Nesher, Lahad, & Shacham define community 
resilience as a community’s ability to “stand firm” against loss of life or damage (2002).   
Kulig discussed community resiliency research by Mangham, McGrath, Reid, & Stewart 
that proposed adaptation of a similar type of risk and protective factor framework to the 
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community level (2000). This work also presented lists of variables that positively and 
negatively impact a community, but was criticized for not addressing the dynamic nature of 
community and the changes communities can undergo during a collective reaction to stress like 
disaster or war.  
Krovetz suggests that schools, however, are poor exemplars of resilient communities 
(1999). Most schools have too-large classes and a school day that is too hectic to allow 
meaningful interaction among students and staff. This combination prevents the setting of high 
expectations and ability to offer support and value the participation of each student. In contrast, 
Krovitz identifies “gangs” as very resilient communities. He defines gangs as everything from 
the common image of a group of delinquent thugs to the informal groups that attend synagogue 
or Boy Scouts together. In these units where students feel trusted, accepted, supported and 
respected, they demonstrate more resilient characteristics. Individual and collective capacity to 
triumph over shared adversities is rooted in maintaining and augmenting perceptions of being 
supported, of social cohesion and cooperation, and of a sense of belonging to a valued social 
group and community (Bonanno, Brewin, Kaniasty & La Greca, (2010).  
In nursing, community resilience was initially developed to clarify the role and definition 
of community beyond that of geographic groups of people or groups of groups in the 
environment domain of nursing theory (Kulig, 2000). While Kulig’s initial developmental work 
was primarily done with a rural Appalachian community that recovered from both economic and 
natural disaster, further expansion of the concept has expanded the scope of her model. The three 
current components of Kulig’s Community Resiliency Model are 1) interactions are experienced 
as a collective unit, 2) expression of a sense of community, and 3) community action (2000).  
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According to Kulig, the first component includes evidence of getting along, a sense of 
belonging, and networks (2000). The second component derives from the first, and includes a 
sense of community, both in mentality and outlook (hope, spirit). The third component is a 
combination of the first two into a community cohesiveness that is necessary for collective 
action, specifically that action of coping, problem solving, and recovery.  
Regardless of the whether models measure the concept of disaster resilience at the micro 
(individual, family), macro (community, systems), or everything-in-between level, most are 
roughly comprised of two shared features: 1) the ability to resist and absorb disturbances and 2) 
the ability to reorganize and recover reasonably quickly (retain the same basic structure and 
return to the same functional level) (Mayunga, 2009). These commonalities and those elements 
of resilience already addressed informed the development of the Perception of Network 
Resilience Survey tool created for this study to measure 5 characteristics of the construct of 
network resilience. See Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Five Characteristics of the Construct of Network Resilience  
*Robustness 
Strength or ability of elements or systems {the network}….to withstand a 
given level of stress or demand without suffering degradation or loss of 
function. 
*Resourcefulness 
Capacity of the element [or] system {the network} to identify problems, 
establish priorities, and mobilize and exchange resources when conditions 
exist that threaten to disrupt some element [or] system {the network}. 
*Redundancy Extent to which elements [or] systems {of the network} exist that are substitutable. 
*Rapidity Capacity {of the network} to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely manner in order to contain losses and avoid future disruption. 
Relationships Strength of connectivity between {network} entities 
*included in MCEER’s 4Rs -  Dimensions of Resilience (Univ. of Buffalo) 
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Understanding the relative role of network characteristics in performance can help 
networks recognize their own strengths and more critically evaluate how the network structure 
influences the resource and information exchanges network members have within the network. 
Informed network development can help develop and protect strategic relationships that allow 
members to remain viable, protect their missions and respond to community needs during times 
of stress.      
The diversity of the literature base around models of community resilience is surpassed 
only by the consistency of themes in community resilience models of support, trust, unity, and 
inclusion as important indicators of resilience for both individuals and communities. Resilience 
theories have consistently found that relationships with high levels of trust and exchange are 
considered protective during harmful experiences for both individuals and groups. Given the 
emphasis in community resilience theory on relationships built on trust and exchange, 
community resilience is presented as a predictor of network resilience in this study. 
Network Theory 
Just as John Donne wrote “No man is an island…”, modern interpretation would suggest 
that “No man is a network”. Although over 400 years have passed since the poet penned his 
Meditation XVII, the truth is that no one person can stand alone against all hardship and adversity 
that life can bring and expect to survive it.  In fact, the formation of cooperative partnerships or 
networks is one of the oldest and most commonly considered strategies for addressing collective 
human (community) need (Provan, Veazie, Staten, & Teufel-Shone, 2004). Network theory 
guides analysis of the interactions and resources embedded within and available through 
relationships between network members. In this study, it guided development of the Network 
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Resilience Scale to measure the network characteristics of rapidity, redundancy, relationships, 
resourcefulness and robustness as indictors of a resilient network. 
A nontraditional tool, networking joins the ranks of local self-organization, community 
training, and communication technology as a mechanism of indirect governance practice. 
Podolny and Page defined a network as a set of entities that “pursue repeated, enduring exchange 
relations with one another”(1998).  In the public administration field, networks are considered to 
belong to one of three taxonomies. The first, policy networks, are identified as those networks 
with a primary function of collaborative or distributive decision making about resource 
allocation. The second, collaborative networks, are identified as those networks focused on 
shared production or provision of public services. The final type, governance networks, are 
focused on working toward common goals, often integrating collaborative service delivery and 
collective policy making (Kapucu, 2015). For the purpose of this research, state emergency 
management networks are treated as governance networks although each state network may 
reflect a different ratio of collaborative delivery to collective policy making based on culture, 
legislative authorities, and organizational structure. 
Networks have the potential to enhance community resiliency and boost sustainable 
disaster recovery because they reflect a structure designed to facilitate exchange of information 
and/or resources, which stimulates trust. This trust is an intangible asset that acts as a proxy 
pipeline for information flow, mutual aid and collective action - a concept identified as social 
capital by Robert Putnam (2000).  Much of the exchange that occurs within networks is a result 
of communication pathways. In formal networks like those that represent interorganizational 
relationships communication pathways are clearly delineated and are often represented by 
straight lines and predictable patterns based on shared goals or resources. More informal 
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networks, like social networks, demonstrate communication channels that more closely resemble 
wandering cow paths. These channels develop along less predictable lines based on shared 
interests and experiences. 
Social capital is a necessary antecedent for community resiliency because it signifies that 
communities are connected in such a way that individuals and groups that consider themselves 
members of that community trust each other enough to reach out in support of each other.  
That support expedites sharing of resources and information and functions as a protective factor 
against vulnerability during a disaster and for sustainable recovery afterwards. This research 
hypothesizes that networks of emergency management entities share some basic characteristics 
to facilitate that exchange to build trust. Those basic characteristics are conceptualized as the 
construct of network integrity in this study. The three elements of that construct include degree 
of network insulation from the community it serves, fairness and equity of distribution of 
economic and policy decision making power, and readiness to respond collaboratively to an 
emergency. These elements were identified by the researcher as indicators of network capacity to 
adapt as a system. 
To understand how networks develop, it is important to understand what they are. 
Networks can be defined as groups of entities (computers, people, and organizations) that 
participate in a relational exchange – usually of information or resources. The frequency and 
quality of that exchange can be influenced by the type of relationship the entities, also known as 
nodes in network theory, share with each other and the types of relationships between other 
entities in the network.  Early development of network analysis theory viewed organizations in 
society as a system of objects joined by a variety of relationships (Tichy, Tushman, and 
Fombrun, 1979). Two decades later, Bazzioli et al were able to do a similar but more specific 
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classification of approximately 70% of hospital-led health networks and 90% of hospital led 
health systems into well-defined organizational clusters in three parallel strategic/structural 
dimensions based on their analysis of entity relationships across systems (1999). Both Tichy et 
al’s model and Bazzioli’s classification demonstrate early evidence of the themes of rapidity, 
redundancy, reliability, relationships and robustness in network analysis theory. See Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Dimensions of Desirable Network Assets 




1) Transactional content (exchange by social 
relationship) 4 types include: exchange of 
information, exchange of affect (liking, 
friendship), exchange of influence or power, and 
exchange of goods or services. 
1) Differentiation - the 
number of different 
products/services along 





2) Nature of the Links: (Strength and qualitative 
nature of relationship between social objects)    
These links can be characterized by intensity, 
reciprocity, clarity of expectations, and 
multiplexity. 
2) Integration – efforts 








3) Structural Characteristics: the overall pattern 
of relationships between the systems actors. 
Four levels include: external network, total 
internal network, clusters within the network, and 
individuals as special (social) nodes within the 
network. 
3) Centralization – 
extent that activities 
and/or management are 







The Community of Practice model is another network development strategy focused on 
identifying and enhancing information exchange in networks (Anderson, Hennessy, Cornes & 
Manthorpe, 2013). This network model creates a structure to facilitate access to peer support for 
health providers who care for patients with complex needs in order to mediate the providers’ 
feelings of role or service isolation and to sustain motivation, an essential element of network 
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sustainability.  This model informed the objective definition of network integrity as an 
antecedent in this study.  
Once relationships and exchange were seen as common themes in network structure,  
researchers began to explore how best to measure and quantify elements of those themes.  
Network analysis evolved as a mapping strategy that allows us to see how an agent is embedded 
within a system and how the structure of the system emerges by quantifying the number, scale 
and scope of relationships between network entities. Three types of centrality measures are 
commonly used to illustrate the significance of an entity’s network position (Kar & Hatmaker, 
2008). Kapucu describes degree centrality as the estimate of an entity’s importance within the 
network in terms of their number of ties to other agents (2006). Hanneman describes betweeness 
centrality as the measure of the position of one network entity in relation to others, a good 
indicator of capacity to trade information or resources (Kapucu, Yuldashev, & Feldheim, 2011). 
Finally, Krebs described closeness centrality as the measure of how close an entity is to other 
entities in the network based on shortest distance between connections (2004). According to 
Krebs, betweenness measures the control a node has over how exchange flows in the network 
(how often is this node/entity on the path between other nodes?) while closeness measures how 
easily a node/entity can access what is available via the network (how quickly can this node 
reach all others in the network?) (2004). A network position where one node has easy access to 
others while controlling the access of other nodes in the network reveals high informal power, an 
important element of robust collaboration. Krebs and Holley describe a few considerations that 
network analysis can shed light on to answer these questions and strengthen economic and 
organizational performance (2002): 
• Are the right connections (arcs) in place? Are any key connections missing? 
29 
• Who is playing leadership roles in the community? Who is not, but should be? 
• Who are the experts in process, planning and practice? 
• Who are the mentors that others seek out for advice? 
• Who are the innovators? Are ideas shared and acted upon?  
These measures of centrality informed the importance of including the characteristic of 
relationships in the measurement model for network resilience in this study.  
Kapucu builds on Scott’s measurement of networks by suggesting that in addition to 
looking at the ties or relations evaluated for selected entities, it is important to also evaluate how 
connected they are to one another, or the strength of the connection (2005). Assessing network 
relationships for both centrality and density can reflect patterns of trust, exchange, 
communication, and coordination among disaster response actors, all essential components of a 
network that can respond rapidly to changing needs for information and resource exchange. A 
network with many short connections between agents reflects a potential for robust, flexible, 
rapid response to stimuli because the potential for “noise” across communication and 
coordination exchange paths is smaller than that for those agents with relationships across great 
lengths (Kapucu, 2005). In disaster, that speed and responsiveness is critical to move information 
and resources efficiently and effectively in an environment of uncertainty that characterizes the 
early hours of any response. 
Network research has consistently demonstrated that most networks can be resilient to the 
loss of random entities, but will lose integrity if a hub entity that is both centrally and strongly 
connected is lost (Scott, 2012). Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins encourage an additional dimension of 
network evaluation, clique analysis, to hone understanding of the way small intimately connected 
groups with shared patterns of interaction can impede or improve resource and information 
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exchange during disaster (2010). Awareness of the presence of cliques is important to direct 
observation of network exchange for evidence of obstruction.    
In networks where resource exchange patterns are established and stable, it certainly 
seems sensible that removing an integral entity would disrupt that exchange so network 
development efforts should be directed at maintaining the strength and primacy of those strong 
entities. Onnela et al, however, found that communication exchange flowed best through 
intermediate or weakly linked relationships (2007). Emergency management entities rely heavily 
on their network to support communication exchange during emergencies, so it is important to 
develop both intermediate and weak ties to maintain network integrity to support that need. In 
this study, respondents are surveyed regarding their perceptions of three indicators of network 
integrity that reflect the importance of strong, intermediate and weak ties; the fairness and equity 
of the distribution of decision making power across the network, the degree of insulation 
between their network and community, and the level of network preparedness to collaborate in 
an emergency. In their work on resilience and characteristics of the network that emerged in 
response to the World Trade Center attack on 9-11, Tierney and Trainor suggest that the multi-
organizational networks that emerge in response to disaster represent a form of organization that 
is distinct from other types of organizational arrangements (2003).   
At first glance, software renditions of network analysis of relationships in non-disaster 
related networks reflect little more than colorful chaos.           
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Figure 2. Network Analysis of High School Friendships   (Moody, 2001) 
 
 




Figure 4. Network Analysis of Contagion of TB  (Krebs, 2004) 
 
In contrast, research into the actual network taxonomy demonstrates the opposite of 
chaos; in one significant study of health networks and systems, three strategic/structural 
dimensions including differentiation and centralization, which are measures of redundancy, were 
able to classify approximately 70% of hospital-led health networks and 90% of hospital led 
health systems into well-defined organizational clusters (Bazzoli et al, 1999).  
Since disaster management can be viewed as a problem of material, personal, and 
information logistics, network models that address supply are highly relevant (Helbing, 
Ammoser & Kuhnert, 2006). Networks that can measure supply, demand, and impedance among 
their entities can then better model resource allocation (Walsh, Page, & Gesler, 1997). This 
modeling and resulting simulation analysis can help to identify patterns and connections of 
information, goods, and service flows among these actors to evaluate characteristics of 
resourcefulness and robustness.   
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While there are different purposes behind model development, according to Pritsker, 
gaining knowledge of these system interactions and interdependencies through modeling makes 
it possible to evaluate the impact of the operations of the components on the entire system.  This 
impact then guides organizational response to system performance, as the best operating single 
component is secondary to the overall system performance (1997).   
Unfortunately, there is limited data about which network characteristics are most 
important to improve state emergency management agency network resilience. It is important to 
understand how network entities interact so those elements of interaction that have the most 
impact on state emergency management agency capacity to develop and nurture organizational 
intentional alliances and relationships can be identified. Once these characteristics are identified, 
interventions can be developed to strengthen those that influence network resilience. In this 
study, comparison of network characteristics across sampled states could expand understanding 
of differences in those network characteristics and how they develop in relation to each other.  
Once these characteristics are better understood, network analysis can further 
demonstrate how entities are embedded within systems and how the structure of those systems 
changes. When these differences are evaluated against measures of associated community social 
capital, correlations between network characteristics and community social capital may be 
explored.  At points where the network comes into contact with community agents and actors to 
share information and resources, the community benefits from that increase in trust and shared 
common goals, thus experiencing an increase in social capital. Indicators of social capital can be 
considered reflective of protective factors, and an increase in those protective factors will raise 
the level of community resilience. With increased resilience, the community is better able to 
support and care for itself and its infrastructure, reducing vulnerability to future disaster.  
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Specific network characteristics may be associated with higher levels of community 
social capital, or society capacity, which can be seen as an inverse measure of vulnerability. If 
so, then disaster preparedness efforts can be more efficiently and effectively directed to reduce 
community vulnerability to the impacts of hazards by increasing community by funding specific 
types of network development activities that improve social capital.    
As demonstrated in organizational performance literature, an over-constrained system 
will benefit from more freedom whereas an over-free system will require stability to optimize 
performance. In tumultuous environments, agents (organizations) rely on formal and informal 
relationships in order to work together to pursue shared goals and/or address common concerns 
(Kapucu, 2005). The nature of a state emergency response agency is that it has occasion to exist 
in both a ramp-up state of response and recovery to disaster and a stand-down state, when 
planning and preparation take precedent over the response and recovery phases. Historically, the 
dynamic nature of disaster has ensured that the ramp-up phase of disaster response relies more 
on informal relationships, as dependence on formal relationships is more unreliable given the 
changeable variety of actors that could be involved in any given type of disaster. 
Fascinating analysis by Ford, Wells, and Bailey suggests that it is the voluntary nature of 
these network partnerships that makes them unstable (and thus vulnerable) because of the 
uncertainty regarding their partners’ future behavior (2004). Their work suggests that without 
strong institutional or contractual authority to ensure cooperation, health care networks rely on 
the member partners to put the best interests of the alliance before their own individual needs. 
These authors suggest a non-cooperative perspective may better address network relationship 
issues like interdependence, vulnerability, mutual gain, transparency, and coordination while 
offering a more realistic structure to health care networks. In concert with network analysis, the 
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authors applied game theory to the same network players to help explain strategic decisions by 
looking at current behaviors and probable outcomes. Taken together, these strategies can offer 
insight into participant’s choices, plans, and actions. In contrast, Annen (2003) suggests that 
networks of exchange relationships are not so uncertain, and may in fact be valuable because 
they carry low enforcement costs because reputation is a valuable asset that motivates network 
members to cooperate. 
For this study, networks were defined as those agencies and organizations that state 
emergency management employees considered to be involved in collective emergency 
management preparedness, planning, response or recovery within their state. 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
The geographic and temporal uncertainty of disasters is one of the biggest challenges to 
influence preparedness and response strategies around the world. In the United States, citizens 
expect the government to maintain a level of adaptive readiness that is difficult and expensive to 
sustain given the complexity of the many layers of governance and systems involved. It is 
exactly that complexity that invites consideration of complex adaptive theory as a guiding 
principle for this research. 
Complex adaptive systems are complex because they are made up of multiple 
interconnected elements and adaptive because they have the capacity to change in response to 
stimuli and environments. All systems are situated in an environment that is always more 
complex than the system itself. This complexity prevents complete predictability with regard to 
the environment, but the system does depend on some regularity to maintain its infrastructure. It 
is the adaptive component of these complex systems that allows the system to draw down as 
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much predictability as possible from the environment to organize and retain an efficient and 
effective system structure (Jost, 2003).  
Although born from natural sciences like thermodynamics and biology, many concepts of 
complexity theory can be applied to social science. Morçöl suggests social systems are even 
more complex than natural systems because they include actions and relationships between 
entities (people) with complex biological and psychological systems and structures that evolve to 
accommodate those interactions (2015). Dahms suggests this adaptive capacity of an 
organization or social system in a complex and changing environment is, in fact, resilience 
(2010). 
A complicated system can be understood in terms of its parts.  If the whole of the system 
is different from the sum of its parts, then it is complex (Eoyang, 2004). By viewing the network 
that state emergency management agencies exist in as a complex adaptive system, it stands to 
reason that as the system adapts in response to disaster and peacetime environments, the most 
efficient and effective relationships of exchange and trust within the network are the most likely 
to survive. A flexible emergency response system that can effect structural adaptations can 
perform critical emergency tasks more rapidly and effectively (Comfort, 1999). As a complex 
adaptive system, state EM networks with more disaster related experience could be expected to 
demonstrate more structural adaptations. Those adaptations may be reflected in measures of 
network integrity and/or network resilience.  
 The Complex Systems Task Group of the National Academies Keck Futures Initiative 
identified robustness as a key indicator of that flexibility, or network adaptability (National 
Academies, 2009).  Disasters cause significant disruption within networks, even those designed 
to respond to them.  Different types of network topology respond differently to that agitation. 
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The Task Group suggests that the best network structure is a combination of random, where 
nodes are evenly distributed and/or interconnected and scale-free, where limited entities are 
highly interconnected and the majority of nodes have fewer connections (National Academies, 
2009).  This hybrid structure allows the network to adapt based on the threat details, in important 
outcome of a robust state. 
In addition to the aforementioned influence of network theory, the Perception of Network 
Resilience survey was also informed by the key properties of complex adaptive systems 
introduced by Fryer. Selected elements are presented in Table 3. 
 









The structure of the system develops from seemingly random 
patterns of behavior and exchange among and between agents 
within the system. These patterns influence the behavior of the 




The greater the variety in a system, the stronger it is. A system 
structured to require heterogeneity is stronger than one built on 
homogeneity in its agents. 
Redundancy 
Connectivity 
The patterns of relationships and exchange among agents in a 
system are critical to identifying and understanding the strengths 




Vertical command and control hierarchy does not exist in a 
complex adaptive system. Constant re-evaluation and 
reorganizing replaces classical management via constant agent 




Systems exist on a continuum ranging from equilibrium to chaos. 
In a state of equilibrium, a system will lose the internal dynamics 
that allow it to maintain the ability to adapt to its environment, 
and it will die. At the other end of the spectrum, systems in chaos 
cease to function as a system, as functional patterns and reliable 
exchanges that provide internal structure have collapsed. The 
most productive position for a system is on the verge of chaos, 




Good evaluation of a complex system involves pattern description, contextualization, and 
dynamic evolution (Eoyang, 2004).  This research treats each state emergency response network 
as a system that does adapt performance and structure based on evaluation of observed patterns 
of exchange. This evaluation is done consistently within networks after the response phase of an 
event as part of the standard practice of after-action analysis to generate improvement plans. 
Thus, disaster history is an appropriate predictor at the state level of network resilience. in an 
effort to develop a model that illustrates what, if any, impact disaster history has on patterns of 
network characteristics can improve performance of that system.  
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
The goal of this cross sectional factor analysis research study was to better understand the 
attributes of individual and state-level formal and informal relationships that contribute to 
resilience among state emergency management networks. Networks, as adaptive complex 
systems, have the capacity to mobilize collective memory of experiences to develop horizontal 
and vertical collaboration to govern resource management (Norberg, Wilson, Walker & Ostrom, 
2008). This capacity, when applied to awareness of the types of relationships that increase 
network resilience, could allow network actors to more efficiently prioritize activities that build 
trust and exchange within the network to increase network resilience. The following aims and 
hypotheses were identified for this study: 
• Aim 1: To determine if network resilience is validly measured by the constructs of 
redundancy, rapidity, resourcefulness, robustness and relationships. 
o Hypothesis 1: Network resilience can be validly measured by the constructs of 
redundancy, rapidity, resourcefulness, robustness, and relationships. 
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• Aim 2: To determine if specific individual level indicators can predict perception of 
emergency management network resilience.  
o Hypothesis 2: Specific individual level indicators can predict perception of 
emergency management network resilience. 
• Aim 3: To determine if specific state level indicators can predict perception of state 
emergency management network resilience. 
o Hypothesis 3: Specific state level indicators can predict perception of emergency 
management network resilience. 
• Aim 4: To determine if state level variables are more influential than individual-level 
variables in explaining the variability in perceived emergency network resilience. 
o Hypothesis 4: State level variables are more influential than individual level 
variables in explaining the variability in perceived emergency network resilience. 
This research framework is developed from an integrated consideration of the definitions 
of network resilience and determinants of potential influences on network relationships of trust 
and exchange drawn from community resilience, network development and complex 
organizational adaptation theory.  A conceptual model of the proposed indicators of network 
resilience is presented in Figure 5. Individual-level predictor variables include perception of the 
latent variable network integrity, perception of community resilience, length of time employed in 
the field of emergency management, length of time employed at current state emergency 
management agency, gender, and level of educational attainment. State-level predictor variables 
include disaster experience, well-being, emergency management budget, number of full-time 


















CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Chapter Three presents the methodology applied in this study. The research design is 
introduced, followed by details about the study procedure and measurement of the study 
variables. Next, hypotheses, measurement models for network integrity and network resilience 
are proposed and structural models for individual and state level predictors of network resilience 
are presented. In summary, data sources, collection and analysis protocols are discussed. 
Design 
This study employed a two-level cross sectional analysis design. A minimum of 4 
employees from the state emergency management agency each of the 50 United States and 
Washington D.C. were invited via email to complete a web-based 33  item survey about their 
personal perceptions of their state network’s resilience.  Participant survey responses provided 
the data for individual level predictors and indicators of network resilience in this study. 
Additional data from FEMA, the US Census, the American Human Development Index, the 
Social Vulnerability Index and National Emergency Management Agency member database 
informed state-level predictors of network resilience. This study tested relationships between 
emergency management network resilience and three categories of individual level variables 
(demographics, perception of network integrity and perception of community resilience) and 
three categories of state level variables (demographics, disaster experience, and well-being) with 
structural equation modeling.  
Data Sources and Sample 
Survey participants were identified from the 2010 NEMA State Emergency Management 
Agency Membership Directory. Published annually, this directory is created and maintained by 
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the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), a professional association of 
emergency management directors from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and eight U.S. 
territories. Participants from the 8 U.S territories were not invited to participate in this research 
due to considerable variation in emergency management policy and practice between US states 
and territories. Sampling rosters were considered complete when four employees were identified 
for each state. The sampling plan for this study included 204 contacts, approximately 25% more 
than the minimum required to provide adequate power for analysis.  
Individual level data was obtained from the researcher designed survey. Exogenous state-
level variables were obtained from publicly available Federal Emergency Management Agency 
data, Measure of America Human Development Index data, Social Vulnerability Index data, and 
National Emergency Management Association membership data.  
An IRB request for exemption from human subjects research was approved by the 
University of Central Florida’s Office of Research (see Appendix J). The online survey tool 
required respondents to affirm consent to participate in order to begin the survey. See Appendix  
I for the informed consent letter. This research was conducted with a sample of state emergency 
management agency employees from all 50 states. As this research was not site-specific, there 
were no site-specific regulations or customs determined to affect this study. 
There was no anticipated direct benefit of participation for individuals in this research. A 
goal of this research was to better understand strengths of state emergency management 
networks in order to facilitate development of those strengths without the extended trial and error 
associated with repeated real time natural disaster/emergency events. No direct personally 
identifiable data was collected. Some potentially unique demographic data was collected in the 
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form of qualitative responses, but is not reported at the individual level in conjunction with any 
other information that could enable identification. 
Procedures 
The NEMA 2010 directory provided contact information for each State Emergency 
Management Director and up to 7 additional key staff for each state. For those states for which 
the NEMA database included fewer than four contacts, the researcher identified agency staff 
from other sources including official agency web pages and state staff directories. These 
additional staff were added to the sampling plan roster by way of a seniority stratification 
beginning with the Agency Director and followed by any Agency Deputy Directors, Agency 
Assistant Directors, Agency Planning Chiefs, and Agency Deputy Planning Chiefs. Participants 
were invited through their state agency email addresses to complete an anonymous web-based 33 
item survey hosted by SurveyMonkey about their perceptions of the resilience and integrity of 
their current state emergency management network. (See survey questions in Appendix B ). 
Online access to the survey was available for 6 weeks after 204 invitations were sent. Employees 
who received the initial invitation were encouraged to complete the survey and to forward the 
invitation to colleagues within their state agency in a modified snowball sampling plan.  
Despite rigorous effort to ensure an accurate and current distribution list, 9 initial 
invitations representing 8 states were returned as undeliverable with error messages stating the 
recipient could not be identified or did not exist. Email addresses for those 9 rejected subjects 
were rechecked against on-line state agency web pages or directories. An updated email address 
was found for one of the 9 subjects and the invitation was re-sent.  Alternate email addresses 
could not be found for the remaining 8 subjects so they were assumed to no longer be employed 
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with their respective state agencies. The seniority stratification plan described above was used to 
identify additional subjects in the 7 affected states. A total of 151 participants from 47 states 
provided valid survey responses. 
With regard to individual level variables, one of the three indicators for the latent variable 
of perception of network integrity was recoded to adjust for response direction.  
Measurement of Study Variables 
As previously identified, three latent constructs were evaluated in this study. Two reflect 
the state level variables of state disaster experience and state well-being. The state disaster 
experience construct includes presidential major disaster declarations and presidential emergency 
disaster declarations by state from 1995-2010. The state well-being construct includes two 
measures, the Human Development Index and the Social Vulnerability Index. Data for the third, 
perception of state emergency management network resilience, was collected at the individual 
person level. This construct was measured by the researcher designed Perception of Network 
Resilience (PoNR) survey administered to employees in state emergency management agencies.  
Individual Level 
The 33 item PoNR survey tool measured 5 individual respondent demographic variables 
(current state of employment, length of time employed in emergency management, length of 
time employed at current state agency, gender, and highest level of education) and 28 questions 
on a 10 point likert scale. Twenty-four of those questions surveyed respondent perceptions of the 
five constructs identified as indicators of state emergency management network resilience. Four 
questions evaluated perception of network rapidity, 6 questions evaluated perception of network 
redundancy, 4 evaluated perception of network resourcefulness, 4 evaluated perception of 
45 
network robustness, and 6 evaluated perception of network relationships.  Perception of state EM 
network integrity was measured by 3 additional questions that queried respondent’s views on the 
power, readiness and connectedness of their state emergency management network. Finally, 
respondents were asked 1 question about their perception of current community resilience to 
disaster in their home state.  
State Level 
Demographics 
State level demographic data obtained from the NEMA membership report included state 
budget dedicated to emergency management services and number of full time state emergency 
management agency employees. FEMA region was collected from the NEMA report and 
confirmed against a published FEMA web based region map. Population for each state was 
retrieved from the 2010 United States Census Report. Given the differences between states in 
size, population, and agency organizational structure, basic budget comparison is not an accurate 
means of comparison across states. Some comparison can be achieved, however, by determining 
the average expenditure of each state emergency management agency per citizen. For example, if 
a State emergency budget is $1,000.00 and it has 1000 residents, per person spending is $1.00. 
For the purpose of this study, budget was defined as average state emergency management 
agency expenditure per state citizen.  
Disaster Experience 
State disaster experience is comprised of two indicators in this study, presidential major 
disaster declarations and presidential emergency disaster declarations. Both types of presidential 
declarations reflect an environment where joint state and local capacity to deliver the resources 
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required for the state to recover from a disaster or event are exceeded. State Governors may 
request federal assistance under the Stafford Act to augment state and local response efforts. 
Enacted in 1988 to amend the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, the Stafford Act establishes the legal 
authority for most Federal disaster response activities, chiefly as they pertain to FEMA programs 
and resources. 
To request relief under the Stafford Act, the governor of an affected state seeks a 
presidential declaration by submitting a written request to the President through their FEMA 
regional office. The Governor’s letter must certify that the severity and magnitude of the disaster 
exceed state and local capabilities. It must also confirm that Federal assistance is essential to 
supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments and partners, to verify 
execution of the state's emergency plan; and certify adherence to cost sharing requirements.  
Upon receiving a Governor’s request, FEMA teams execute a preliminary damage 
assessment of the affected areas. Once FEMA regional and national office staff review both the 
Governor’s request and preliminary damage assessment, FEMA provides the President with an 
analysis of the situation and a recommended course of action. Presidential emergency disaster 
declarations are issued for imminent disasters or to support life safety or rescue needs when 
expenditures are estimated to be less than $5 million dollars (Sylves, 2008). 
State of Well Being 
Social Vulnerability Index 
“An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailments of all republics.”       
- Plutarch, Greek historian, c.100 A.D 
It is increasingly understood that health is influenced largely by the locally specific built, 
natural, and social environments within communities—the social determinants of health 
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(Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2015a). It is important to consider the impact of emergency 
management related policy and practice change on community health status. In order to measure 
impact, it is necessary to first measure baseline community well-being. In an attempt to inform 
that baseline assessment, two measures of well-being were conceptualized for this study;  the 
Social Vulnerability Index and the Human Development Index.  
The Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI®) 2006-2010 is a synthesis of 30 socioeconomic 
variables identified via research literature review as impacting a community’s ability to prepare 
for, respond to, and recover from hazards. Created by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, index data is drawn from the 2010 US Census and the Five Year American 
Community Survey. Data from the 2006-2010 version of the SoVi was used in this study. 
Researchers found that, in that 2006-2010 data, just seven significant components contributed to 
72% of the variance in social vulnerability scores across U.S. counties (Cutter, Boroff, & 
Shirley, 2006). Those 7 significant domains include race and class; wealth; elderly 
residents; Hispanic ethnicity; special needs individuals; Native American ethnicity; and service 
industry employment.  The Social Vulnerability Components Summary, a brief explanation of 
those population characteristics identified by the SoVI can be found in Appendix C. Since Social 
Vulnerability Index Data is collected at the U.S. Census tract level, it had to be aggregated and 
averaged to create a state level score for this study. This procedure did disallow the impact of 
population concentration on tract scores but was included because no other appropriate data was 
identified to measure vulnerability from the theoretical perspective of this study. Higher scores 
represent increased vulnerability due to decreased ability to prepare for, respond to and recover 
from disaster. Lower scores represent decreased vulnerability, or an increased ability among state 
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residents to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disaster. See Appendix D for a table of 
Social Vulnerability Index scores by state.  
Human Development Index  
Like Plutarch, scholars have recognized the risk in believing that measures of national 
wealth alone can accurately reflect the welfare of a society for over 2,000 years. In the last 50 
years, social policy and planning experts have warned that many economic development policies 
ignore or contribute to large areas of poverty and exclusion from economic and social progress 
(Noorbakhsh, 1998). Global recognition of this risk led to development of measures that 
recognized human capability as capital beyond the economics of a nation’s production and 
consumption (Sen, 1984, p.496).  
The most comprehensive of those measures to date is the Human Development Index 
(HDI), published annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2011) since 
1990. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measure at the country level of 
average achievement in three key domains of human development: longevity, knowledge, and 
standard of living (Sagar & Najam, 1998 & Despotis, 2005).  Noorbakhsh identified the 
comprehensive HDI tool as better able to capture many aspects of human development than less 
adequate earlier indices like GDP and per capita income, which neglects distributional aspects of 
income equality (1998).  
Early versions of HDI used life expectancy at birth as a proxy for longevity to reflect 
wellness, adult literacy as a proxy for educational achievement to reflect knowledge and gross 
domestic product as a proxy for income to reflect standard of living. All three measures are 
treated equally in the index with no proxy receiving extra weight in (Neumayer, 2001). HDI 
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methodology was adapted in 2010 for the indicators measuring education and income. As a 
binary variable that only identified “literate/illiterate”, adult literacy was found to be an 
inadequate measure of education. Average years of schooling and expected years of schooling 
were added to adult literacy as indicators of knowledge achievement. The income indicator of 
Gross Domestic Product was replaced by Gross National Income to reflect the importance of 
measuring the retention of value of income accrued to residents – not only the value of what was 
produced. Lastly, the HDI recognized the complexities of comparing economic indicators across 
187 countries with different financial systems in 2011.  In order to better address the comparative 
challenges those differences present, HDI data is first converted to a common currency indicator, 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) international dollars, that reflects a standard purchasing power. 
One international dollar in the United States is equivalent to one international dollar in Sierra 
Leone. GNI figures have been reported in PPP dollars since 2011 (UNDP, 2011). The HDI has 
faced critique for both its inability to account for cultural inequality between countries and it’s 
lack of aptitude to determine how sustainable development standings may be (Hicks, 1997 & 
Neumeyer, 2001). 
This study evaluated data from the American Human Development Index (HDI), a 
variation of the Human Development Index, as a component of the latent construct of state well-
being. The American Human Development Index was adapted from the UNDP HDI to reflect 
US context and available data by Measure of America, a non-partisan, nonprofit program of the 
Social Science Research Council. The American HDI uses life expectancy at birth as a proxy 
measure for longevity, educational degree attainment and school enrollment as measures of 
knowledge, and median earnings as the indicator for standard of living. Data for the American 
HDI are collected from official U.S. government sources through the American Community 
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Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Lower 
HDI scores mean lower insulation against negative disaster related impact because the conditions 
that increase vulnerability are more prevalent. Data from the Measure of America Human 
Development Index scale was transformed to reflect the same directional level as the Social 
Vulnerability Index data so higher scores mean higher risk for both variables.  HDI data was 
disaggregated by state for this research and can also be disaggregated by congressional district, 
gender, race and ethnicity (Lewis & Burd-Sharps, 2010). HDI scores by state can be found in 
Appendix E. Variable definitions and data collection methods are presented in Table 4 and Table 
5. 
 
Table 4. Endogenous Variables: Definitions and Sources of Information 
Variable Definition Source  Accessibility 
Resilience 
Robustness 
Index measure of inherent strength within 
state network that reflects resistance to 
resource or information exchange failure  
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
Relationships  
Index measure of the scope and strength of 
network member connectedness with federal, 
regional and state partners. 
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
Rapidity  
Index measure of speed with which network 
members can exchange resources and 
information within the state.   
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
Redundancy  
Index measure of systemic network properties 
that allow for substitution of services and 
exchange of resource and information within 
the state. 
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
Resourcefulness  
Index measure of capacity of network to 
mobilize collective resources and efficiently 
establish collective priorities within the state. 
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
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Table 5. Exogenous Variables: Definitions and Sources of Information by Level 





Years worked in 
emergency 
management field 
PoNR Survey Researcher permission 
Years Agency 




PoNR Survey Researcher permission 
Gender Gender PoNR Survey Researcher permission 








PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
Network Integrity 
Integrity_1 
Measure of insulation 
(distance) between 
State Emergency 
Mgmt Network and 
communities within 
the state. 
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
Integrity_2 
Measure of fairness 
and equity of 
distribution of power 




within the state. 
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
Integrity_3 
Measure of Network 
capacity to respond 
collaboratively to an 
emergency or disaster 




Capacity of all 
communities within 
the state to respond 
with strength in the 
face of adversity to 
PoNR Survey Researcher Permission 
52 
Variable Operational Definition 
Source of 
Information Accessibility 
reach a higher level of 
function in recovery. 
State 
Demographics 
Full Time State 
Employees 
# of full time 
emergency 
management 
employees in the state 
2010 NEMA Annual 
Report Member subscription 
State EM Budget 
Amount of state 
emergency 
management agency 
budget PER citizen 
2010 NEMA Annual 
Report Member subscription 
Population State population per 2010 U.S. Census U.S. Census Public information 
FEMA Region 
1 of 10 geographic 
multi-state areas 
served by a FEMA 
office  
 
FEMA.gov Public information 
 State Disaster Experience  
MDD 
Major Presidential 
Disaster Declarations  
from 1995 -2010 
FEMA.gov Public information 
EDD 
Emergency 
Presidential  Disaster 
Declarations from 
1995 - 2010 
FEMA Public information 
State Well Being 
HDI Human Development Index 
Measure of America 
Index 2010/11 Public Information 
SoVI Social Vulnerability Index 
Hazards & 
Vulnerability 
Research Institute  
Public Information 
 
Development of the Analytical Model 
The goal of this research was to better understand the attributes of formal and informal 
relationships that contribute to resilience among state emergency management networks. 
Structural equation modeling was identified as the analysis technique most appropriate for this 
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research. The findings generated from this study could allow network actors to more efficiently 
prioritize activities that build trust and exchange within the network to increase network 
resilience. Networks, as adaptive complex systems, have the capacity to mobilize collective 
memory of experiences to develop horizontal and vertical collaboration to govern resource 
management (Norberg, Wilson, Walker & Ostrom, 2008).  
Study Aim 1 
The goal was initially addressed by defining measurement of network resilience specific 
to state emergency management (EM) networks via the first study aim, to determine if network 
resilience can be validly measured by state emergency management agency employee perception 
of the constructs of network redundancy, network rapidity, network resourcefulness, network 
robustness and network relationships.  Each construct was measured by 4 to 6 questions in the 
researcher designed Perception of Network Resilience survey tool (see Figure 6).  Methodology 
for this aim included correlation analysis, analysis of scale validity, and confirmatory factor 
analysis for the measurement model. 
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Figure 6. A Second-Order Factor Measurement Model of Perceived Network Resilience with 
Five Domains or Five First-Order Factors 
 
Study Aim 2 
The study goal was also addressed by the second aim of the study to determine if specific 
individual-level indicators can predict perception of emergency management network resilience. 
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These predictors include individual demographic measures of length of work experience in the 
emergency management field, length of work experience at their current state emergency 
management agency, gender, level of educational attainment, perception of community 
resilience, and the latent variable perception of network integrity, which is comprised of three 
indicators. It is hypothesized that specific individual level variables may influence the 
opportunity for resource and exchange between state emergency management network agencies 
and affect resilience.  
With regard to time, a longer time in a field or agency role can increase the likelihood 
that an individual in a state emergency management network would come in contact with other 
emergency management network entities to exchange information or resources and in turn, 
increase the opportunity to develop relationships of trust.  
Educational attainment may influence perception of network resilience because more 
advanced study may reflect advanced exposure to emergency management network concepts and 
increased capacity to recognize and appreciate the elements of a resilient network. Gender is 
identified as a possible influential indicator based on the common perception that women have 
stronger relational skills, which may indicate a higher level of perception about those 
relationships that affect network resilience.  
Since some communities are lauded for being more resistant to disaster impact, 
community resilience is included as a possible individual level predictor variable of network 
resilience to determine if there is a relationship between disaster resilient communities and 
perception of network resilience. For example,  London was “resilient” in the wake of 
coordinated suicide bombings in 2005, businesses need to be “resilient” to be successful in the 
face of terrorism, and the stock market was “resilient” after the 9/11 bombings (Dougherty, 
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2005). Finally, perception of network integrity is evaluated as a possible predictor of perception 
of network resilience via three questions that assess perceptions of network insulation, 
distribution of decision making power, and collaborative readiness.  
Methodology for this aim included correlation analysis and confirmatory factor analysis 
of a measurement model for network integrity (Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Measurement Model of Perception of Network Integrity 
 
It also included a structural model that explored the relationships between the predictor 
variables of individual demographics (state, gender, length of time employed in emergency 
management, length of time employed at current state agency, and educational attainment), 
perception of community resilience, and perception of network integrity on perception of 
network resilience (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Initial Structural Model for Individual Level Predictors of Perceived Network 
Resilience 
 
Study Aim 3 
The third aim of this research addressed the study goal by determining if specific state 
level indicators can predict perception of state emergency management network resilience. State 
level ecological indicators include disaster history, state well-being and state demographics 
including population, state emergency management budget, full time emergency management 
employees and FEMA region. It is posited that an EM network’s resilience would be influenced 
by the amount of experience that state network had responding to disasters. The more experience 
emergency management network entities have working with each other, the more likely they are 
to have opportunities to exchange resources from tanker trucks to information. Resource 
exchange is the mechanism by which network members develop trust in each other – a trust that 
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allows them to attain a state of resilience that increases the integrity of the network and allows 
the whole to be more than the sum of the parts.  
Methodology for this aim included correlation analysis and  covariance structure analysis 
of a predictive model (Figure 9) that explored the relationship between state disaster experience 
from 1995- 2010, state well-being, state demographic data and state emergency management 
employee perception of their network’s resilience. Disaster experience was measured by FEMA 
data on presidential major disaster declarations and presidential emergency disaster declarations 
from 1995-2010. State well-being was measured by the Social Vulnerability Index and the 
American Human Development Index. Demographic data was collected from the National 
Emergency Management Association, FEMA, and the U.S. Census. Network resilience was 
measured by state emergency management agency employee response to the PoNR survey. 
 
 
Figure 9. Initial Structural Model for State Level Predictors of Perceived Network Resilience 
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Study Aim 4 
The study goal was also addressed by the fourth and final aim of this research, to 
determine if state level variables are more influential than individual-level variables in 
explaining the variability in perceived emergency network resilience. Ecological state level 
variables included the number of full time employees in the state emergency management 
agency, percentage of state budget allocated to emergency management activity, state population 
and FEMA region. State well-being was measured by the Social Vulnerability Index and the 
Measure of America Human Development Index. Methodology for this aim included 
confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate a two-level analytical model that combined both 




Figure 10. Proposed Two-Level Structural Model of Predictors of Perceived Network Resilience 
 
Analysis 
Data were analyzed by descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and structural equation 
modeling (confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis) in IBM SPSS Statistics software 
across versions 19-22 and AMOS graphics software. Data cleaning was performed to analyze 
data integrity. Missing data was transformed first by case screening to identify missing data, 
unengaged responses, and outliers. Descriptive statistics including frequency, minimum, 
maximum, mean, and standard deviation were performed for each variable as an initial 
examination of the distribution of the data and to check for errors. 
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 Data was assessed for normality by visual inspection of histograms and box plots for 
distribution symmetry and by statistical test for skewness and kurtosis. Scores from Shapiro-
Wilk’s and Z-testing were obtained. Z-testing was performed by dividing the skew and kurtosis 
values by their own standard error. For a sample size between 50 and 300, absolute z-scores 
under 3.29 reflect a normal distribution (Kim, 2013). In a normal distribution, a skew value of 
zero would imply symmetric distribution. A positive skew value indicates that the distribution 
tail to the right is longer than the tail to the left, and that more values lie to the left of the mean. 
A negative skew value indicates that the distribution tail on the left side is longer, and the 
majority of the values lie to the right of the sample mean. A positive kurtosis suggests the sample 
distribution is highly peaked, while a negative kurtosis suggests the distribution is more 
platykurtic, or flatly distributed.  
Descriptive statistics were analyzed for state ecological variables and PoNR survey 
responses. Correlation analysis was performed to identify linear association between variables. 
Where parametric tests are indicated for correlation analysis, Dancey and Reidy (2002) suggest 
the strength of the correlation be interpreted using the absolute value of r where  
•  0.0 is “zero” 
• .10-.39 is “weak” 
• .40-.69 is “moderate”  
• .70-.99 is “strong”  
• 1.0 is “perfect” 
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to evaluate the measurement models for Network 
Resilience (see Figure 6) and Network Integrity (see Figure 7) and assess validity and reliability 
of the PoNR resilience scale via Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, a measure of internal consistency 
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for a single administration scale (Suhr & Shay, 2009). Confirmatory factor analysis is a theory 
driven technique wherein a hypothesis driven model is used to predict a population covariance 
matrix that is then compared to an observed covariance matrix obtained from data (Schreiber et 
al, 2006).  Confirmatory factor analysis reduces measurement error by allowing multiple 
indicators per latent variable. This technique evaluates the way data fits into a model developed 
with guidance from logic and theory, which differs from exploratory factor analysis, a technique 
to search through the data to identify a model based on statistical relationships identified by the 
data set.  
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is an appropriate method for data analysis in this 
study because it is considered a combination of factor analysis, latent growth modeling and 
regression or path analysis (Hox & Bechger, 2007). SEM allows more flexible assumptions than 
multiple regression, especially in the allowance of interpretation with multicollinearity. SEM 
methods allow hypothesis testing of the theoretical structure of causal forces that influence 
complex relationships. Because SEM demands that relationships between variables be specified 
in a structural model before analysis, it is useful to test theoretical propositions of causality.  
Model fit was evaluated via analysis of several goodness-of-fit indices. Just as a 12-lead 
EKG provides much more comprehensive data about the integrity of the heart than a 3-lead EKG 
due to the use of more data point perspectives, multiple goodness-of-fit indicators are required to 
complete a robust model assessment, as each single measure only provides information on 
certain aspects of the model (Mulaik et al, 1989).  
Several goodness of fit indices were analyzed to evaluate the study models, as each index 
evaluates certain aspects of each model so no single index can successfully measure model fit 
(Mulaik et al, 1989). The chi square statistic is the most frequently used test in structural 
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equation modeling. Chi-square tests whether the estimated covariance matrix and the observed 
covariance matrix converge toward zero as sample size increases to reflect. A significant chi-
square sometimes indicates a model is not acceptable, although this measure can be disregarded 
when sample sizes are large or other indices indicate acceptable fit because complexity, sample 
size, and violation of normality can all influence accuracy. When the chi-square is insignificant, 
the model is accepted.  
The Comparative Fit Index, or CFI, is recommended for routine use as an incremental fit 
index to measure proportional improvement in fit between the target model and an independence 
model. Both the CFI and RMSEA are considered independent of sample size (Fan, Thompson, 
and Wang, 1999). The closer the CFI is to 1, the better the fit. CFI should be > .93 to accept the 
model (Byrne, 1994).    
The Tucker-Lewis Index is also a measure of incremental fit. Model fit is less likely to be 
overestimated as parameters increase with TLI than with the earlier NFI, or the Bentler-Bonett 
normed fit index. A TLI over .90 or .95 is considered acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Root mean square error of approximation, or RMSEA, is based on a residuals matrix that 
looks at discrepancies between predicted and observed covariances. A parsimony adjusted 
measure, RMSEA penalizes models complicated by excessive parameters.  There is adequate 
model fit if RMSEA is less than or equal to .08. Hu and Bentler suggest a RMSEA < .06 as the 
cutoff for a reasonably good model fit (1999).   
Finally, qualitative responses of the PoNR were analyzed for trends and themes. 
Respondents were given the opportunity to share any additional thoughts or feedback for each of 
the 33 survey questions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Study findings are reported in three sections. The first section, exploratory analysis, 
presents descriptive statistics about the sample data. The second section includes descriptive 
analysis of all survey results and discussion of qualitative survey responses to the researcher 
developed survey tool. The third section summarizes results for each hypothesis including 
confirmatory analysis of a measurement model and structural equation results for one individual, 
one state, and one two level analytical model. 
Exploratory Analysis 
A total of 157 surveys were returned over a 3 month period between May and August 
2011. Respondents reported working for state emergency management agencies in 47 states, 
representing all 10 FEMA regions (see Table 6).  The four states with no respondents were from 
FEMA regions 1, 4, 7, and 10.  
 
Table 6. States Represented in Survey Responses by FEMA Region 
FEMA Number of States 
Region 1 5 
Region 2 2 
Region 3 6 
Region 4 7 
Region 5 6 
Region 6 4 
Region 7 4 
Region 8 6 
Region 9 4 
Region 10 3 
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Missing variables in 6 survey responses were imputed. Responses from one participant 
were found to have a standard deviation of 0.00, which suggests no variability in their responses 
so this survey participant was discarded. Visual inspection of responses from 5 other participants 
revealed inadequate variability at standard deviations of 0.1 to 0.2 so those surveys were also 
discarded. All other responses reflected a standard deviation of >0.3 with visual confirmation of 
appropriate variability in responses so a total of 151 engaged and completed surveys were 
available for analysis.   
While respondents were assured that the survey was anonymous, they were offered the 
opportunity to provide contact information so a summary of the findings could be provided to 
them upon study completion. One hundred seven (70%) of the 151 respondents provided contact 
information for that purpose. Contact information was removed from the research data file prior 
to analysis for ensuring confidentiality.  
Normality tests for skewedness and kurtosis, Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p>.05) (Shapiro & 
Wilk, 1965; Razali & Wah, 2011) and visual observation of histograms, normal Q-Q plots and 
box plots suggest that survey scores were normally distributed with no improbably outliers for 
male and female respondents.  Z-test scores confirm normal distribution, as none were higher 
than +3.29. Skewedness and kurtosis scores are reported in Appendix E for individual level 
exogenous variables, and singular and indexed endogenous variables from the Perception of 
Network Resilience survey. 
The number of surveys returned by each state ranged from 1 to 10. The sample goal of 




Table 7. Perception of Network Resilience Survey Responses by State 
 
Of those returned surveys, 40 were completed by women (27%) and 110 by men (73%).  
Respondents reported an average number of 13.2 years of experience in Emergency 
Management. Women reported an average of 11.5 years of emergency management experience, 
ranging from 2 to 30 years. Men reported an average of 14.3 years of emergency management 
experience with a range of 45 years (less than 1 year to 45 years). Respondents reported being 
employed at their current State emergency management agency for an average of 8.6 years. 
Women reported an average length of employment at their current agency of 9.3 years with a 
range of 25 years (less than 1 year to 25 years). Men reported an average length of employment 
at their current agency of 8.3 years with a range of 33 years (less than 1 year to 33 years). Only 3 
women reported being in emergency management for 25 years or longer (8%) compared to 20 
men (18%). A full 70% of men reported being in emergency management for less than 10 years 
(n=77) compared to just 55% of women (n=22).  
Approximately 5% of respondents reported their highest educational attainment as high 
school. 7% of women and 10% of men reported 2 year college degrees. 37% of women and 40% 
Survey Responses by State 











1 response 9 5.8% 5.8% 19.2% 19.2% 
2 responses 14 18.5% 24.3% 29.8% 49.0% 
3 responses 7 13.8% 38.1% 14.9% 63.9% 
4 responses 7 18.4% 56.5% 14.9% 78.8% 
5 responses 2 6.7% 63.2% 4.3% 83.1% 
6 responses 4 15.8% 79.0% 8.4% 91.5% 
7 responses 2 9.3% 88.3% 4.3% 95.8% 
8 responses 1 5.3% 93.6% 2.1% 97.9% 
10 responses 1 6.4% 100.0% 2.1% 100.0% 
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of men reported holding 4 year college degrees. While only 5% of women reported a post 
college certificate, 42% (n=19) reported a graduate degree or post graduate certificate compared 
to 12% of men reporting post college certificates but only 30% (n=33) holding graduate degrees 
or post graduate certificate. Four men reported holding PhD, JD, or other doctoral degree but no 
women reported any doctoral degrees. 
Perception of Network Resilience Survey Analysis 
Basic statistics and trends in Perception of Network Resilience survey data are presented. 
The 33 item survey evaluated respondents’ perceptions of network integrity, community 
resilience, and five latent constructs of network resilience, network rapidity, network 
redundancy, network relationships, network resourcefulness, and network robustness. All 
measurement scales were assessed using a 9-point likert scale. See Appendix E for descriptive 
statistics related to the construct indicators. Demographic data was collected with the first 5 
survey questions.  Respondents were invited to share additional information for each of the 
following 28 questions. An average of 22 qualitative responses were received per question with a 
range of 5-44 responses per question. 
The latent variable of rapidity was evaluated by asking respondents about their perception 
of how quickly they thought network entities could respond to any request from them or 
mobilize to fulfill most of their responsibilities during both emergency and nonemergency states. 
Respondents reported that they thought their network would mobilize more quickly in an 
emergency than in a non-emergency to both do their own work (mean score =7.23 vs. 6.09, 
n=151) and respond to requests for resources (mean = 7.38 vs. 5.94, n=151). 
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Additional qualitative information provided by respondents described expectations for 
network activation during emergency of anywhere from “immediately” to 2 hours depending on 
the type of event. During a non-emergency, respondents suggested that requests are more likely 
to be addressed within 4-24 hours, but that some agencies still work to respond within the same 2 
hour window they use to benchmark response during an emergency. Respondents credited non-
emergency environments of constant joint planning, training, and exercising as very valuable to 
improving collaboration and the likelihood of response but also suggested a better measure for 
non-emergency responsiveness may be comprehensiveness, not rapidity.  
The latent variable of redundancy was measured by evaluating employee perception of 
the frequency with which two or more network entities performed the same roles or functions, 
the likelihood that one network entity could perform the work of another if the original failed, 
and the likelihood of resource (personnel, equipment, supplies) sharing between entities during 
both emergency nonemergency states. Respondents again felt that response during emergencies 
would be better than during a nonemergency state, with mean scores of 4.25 vs 4.07 (n=151) for 
frequency of entities performing redundant roles and functions, 6.13 vs. 5.17 (n=151) for 
likelihood of redundant work performance after entity failure, and 7.15 vs. 4.79 (n=151) for 
frequency of resource sharing.  
It is important to note that both the literature and earlier analysis of the rapidity construct 
in this study suggest that communication and shared planning and preparedness training during 
non-emergency states are valuable activities, yet there is a significant difference in respondent’s 
perception of the frequency with which resources are exchanged during different emergency 
states in this study, with the majority reporting that exchange occurs “very often” during 
emergency but  “not at all often” during nonemergency states. 
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Additional qualitative responses to questions in the redundancy scope reiterated the 
conflict inherent to emergency response – some respondents felt that there was adequate 
communication around hazard and vulnerability assessments to allow the network to identify 
resource gaps which they then filled with cross training, MOUs, or shared purchasing. Other 
respondents pointed out that, for many network entities, job functions during an emergency state 
are different from job functions during a nonemergency state so comparison may not reflect 
accurate assumptions. 
The latent variable of relationships was measured by evaluating respondent perception of 
the strength of their state emergency management network and the strength of relationships 
between their state emergency management agency and other in-state network agencies, out-of-
state agencies in their network, their regional FEMA office, the federal FEMA office, and local 
governments in their state. On a scale of 1-9, higher scores reflect stronger relationships. 
Respondent identified relationships with regional FEMA offices as the strongest and 
relationships with out-of-state entities in their networks as the least strong. 
Qualitative responses to this construct consistently identified politics, budgets, and 
staffing constraints as threats to network strength. Respondents again identified the importance 
(and challenge) of understanding what may be very different partner agency roles in emergency 
and nonemergency states. Technical assistance with training and good communication between 
agency leadership roles were most frequently reported to positively influence relationship 
strength with regional FEMA offices. These FEMA regional office services were also listed most 
often as contributing to relationship strength between state emergency management network 
agencies and out-of-state network partners. Respondents reported lack of contact and agency 
disorganization as frequent influences of their perception of relationship strength with the federal 
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FEMA office but some respondents did state that national FEMA staff was responsive and expert 
when they were called. Respondents reported that time and capacity disparities had a significant 
influence on the strength of agency relationships with local governments. 
The latent variable of resourcefulness or measured employee confidence in the ability of 
network member organizations to establish collective emergency management priorities (mean= 
7.07, n=151), mobilize emergency management resources like personnel, equipment and 
information (mean = 7.50, n=151), efficiently exchange those resources (mean = 6.92, n=151), 
and identify and address collective problems related to emergency management (mean = 6.85, 
n=151). Qualitative responses suggest that formally established structures like Multi-Agency 
Coordination (MAC) and the Governors Executive Policy Decision Group make establishing 
collective emergency management priorities easier, especially when after-action reports are 
widely disseminated. Some respondents suggest that formal systems like mutual aid agreements 
also make mobilizing emergency management resources easier, while others identified less 
formal activity like training and exercising as important to develop a common operating picture. 
Respondents consistently identified the state emergency management agency as the primary 
entity responsible for successful coordination of resource exchange. Respondents also reported 
that formal mechanisms like advisory committees, technical working groups or advisory boards 
have helped guide collective problem solving in their state networks. 
The latent variable of robustness evaluated employee perception of the degree to which 
network member organizations were connected both to the state emergency management agency 
and to each other. It also evaluated perception of the most appropriate number of agencies for 
optimal network strength and perception of the network’s resistance to stress. Respondents felt 
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network organizations were more connected with the state emergency management agency 
(mean=7.13, n=151) than with each other (mean=6.52, n=151).  
With regard to network size, 11% of respondents felt the network would be stronger if 
member entities were removed, 80% of respondents felt no adjustment to the number of network 
entities was needed to improve strength, and 9% felt network strength would be improved by 
adding members. Finally, 5% of respondents felt their state emergency management network 
would begin to suffer a loss of performance and function at the lowest level of stress. More than 
half of respondents (52%) felt their network would experience such a loss under a moderate level 
of stress, while 43% felt their network performance and function would only begin to suffer 
under the highest level of stress. Qualitative submissions varied widely regarding network 
resistance to stress. Some respondents reported that stress itself, usually experienced in the form 
of a response, strengthened the network while others felt lean economic times created stress that 
impacted network performance.  A few respondents felt that the nature of network development 
activities like collaborative planning and training was protective against stress, imbuing network 
performance with a higher threshold of stress resistance. 
Three questions surveyed employee perception of network integrity, a latent variable. 
Respondents were asked about the degree of insulation between the network members and their 
local communities, about the distribution equity of decision making power across the network, 
and about the current state of network readiness to collaborate during an event response.  94% of 
respondents felt their network was not at all or only somewhat insulated from their community. 
Only 6% felt their network was very insulated. Respondents reported that high levels of 
insulation levels were unlikely because emergency management partners are also community 
members, living in the places they work. That duality tends to disallow isolation, as most 
72 
emergency preparedness and response activity happens at very local levels. Factors attributed to 
increased isolation include politics and communication challenges. 
 Over half of respondents felt the power to make economic and policy decisions was 
distributed somewhat fairly and equitably (56%), while 16% felt it was not at all fairly 
distributed and the remaining 28% perceived the distribution of power to be very equitable. 
Respondents differentiated between decisions related to issues of state level authority that are 
conferred by statute or legislation with those decisions that individual entities have the authority 
to interpret. Respondents recognized that often, economic and policy decision making is a 
function of executive state leadership but also acknowledged that strong network solidarity and 
consensus outside of the executive level could influence decisions.  
Finally, 72% of respondents felt their entire emergency management network was very 
well prepared to respond collaboratively to an emergency. Only 5% felt their network was not 
well prepared, with the remaining 23% reporting they felt their network was somewhat well 
prepared to mount a collaborative response to an emergency or disaster. All 10 of those 
employees who shared that their network was actively responding to an emergency at the time of 
their survey participation also expressed that their current collaborative experience was positive. 
Participants were asked how resilient they felt the communities in their home state 
currently were to disaster given a definition of community resilience as ‘the ability of a 
community to respond with strength in the face of adversity, and in so doing reach a higher level 
of function in recovery’. Almost a third of respondents felt their communities were very resilient 
to disaster (32%), 55% believed their communities were somewhat resilient, and only 12% felt 
their communities were not at all resilient. Respondents shared additional perspectives on 
community resilience that reflected beliefs that communities have more capacity to be resilient 
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than individuals, that some communities could recover from an event and be stronger in the face 
of the next disaster, and that, while practice makes perfect, some communities have limited 
ability to invest in reducing risk so small losses can be more devastating to them because they 
have less capacity to absorb the impact. 
Since normality tests showed scaled data to be predominantly normally distributed, 
correlation coefficients were measured by Pearson’s product-moment correlation (r) to determine 
degree of linear relationship, or strength of relationships, between variables.  
Hypothesis Testing and Analysis 
Hypothesis 1  
Hypothesis 1: Network resilience can be validly measured by the constructs of 
redundancy, rapidity, resourcefulness, robustness, and relationships. 
Correlation analysis of each of the factors in all five of the model constructs was 
performed. One question in the construct of rapidity was removed, as results were found to be 
uncorrelated with any other indicators in the construct. A correlation table for individual level 
variables is in Appendix F.  Following correlation analysis, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of 
the measurement model for network resilience was completed. EFA is a statistical technique 
used to evaluate a measurement model without a priori knowledge of how the designated 
indicators may be related to the latent construct. It allows identification of relationships among 
sets of observed values in terms of an unobserved, latent construct and test hypotheses (Wan, 
2002). Since latent constructs are measured by observed indicators, the more the variation in the 
construct can be explained by observed variable indicators, the more rigorous the measurement 
model (Kline, 2005).   
74 
Based on correlation analysis and EFA results, iterative analysis of the initial network 
resilience measurement model resulted in consolidation of 23 questions addressing the 5 
constructs of resilience in state EM networks (rapidity, redundancy, relationships, 
resourcefulness, robustness) to an indexed measurement model with 5 first-order factors or sub-
constructs. The indexed measurement model is illustrated in Figure 11. Correlation coefficients 
for the Perception of Network Resilience Scale can be found in Appendix G. 
 
 
Figure 11. A Measurement Model of Perceived Network Resilience, a Latent Endogenous 
Variable 
 
Constructs in the first order measurement model of network resilience were moderately to 
highly correlated with each other. Correlation indices can be found in Appendix G. The indexed 
measurement model for perceived network resilience included the constructs of rapidity, 
redundancy, relationships, resourcefulness, and robustness. For this model, a χ2 = 5.012, 4df, 
p=.286 and χ2/df =1.253 was not significant, which suggests that the proposed model has an 
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excellent fit to the data and is consistent with observed data. Goodness-of-fit indices support 
acceptance of the revised index model with a CFI=.998, TLI=.992, and RMSEA=.041. A 
summary of parameter estimates for the indexed model in Figure 10 can be found in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Indexed Measurement Model of Perceived 
Network Resilience  
   
Unstandardized  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardized  
Estimate 
Red_I <--- Perc_NR 1.000    .464 
Relat_I <--- Perc_NR 2.429 .399 6.086 *** .921 
Resou_I <--- Perc_NR 2.434 .398 6.114 *** .933 
Robust_I <--- Perc_NR 1.431 .235 6.095 *** .851 
Rapid_I <--- Perc_NR 1.645 .277 5.941 *** .792 
 
 
Once indexed, all five indicators for network resilience were found to be valid measures 
of perception of network resilience. The hypothesis that resilience can be validly measured by 
the constructs of redundancy, rapidity, resourcefulness, robustness, and relationships is accepted. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2: Specific individual level indicators can predict perception of emergency 
management network resilience. 
Individual level indicators included the demographic measures of length of time 
employed in the field of emergency management, length of time employed at current state 
emergency management agency, gender and level of educational attainment. Perception of 
network integrity and perception of community resilience were also evaluated as individual level 
predictor variables of perception of network resilience.  
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Analysis of Pearson correlation coefficients in individual level respondent demographic 
data from the PoNR survey demonstrated a moderate but statistically significant relationship 
between years worked in emergency management and years worked at current state agency for 
female respondents (r=.529, n=41, p<.000) with a longer time working in the field of emergency 
management moderately associated with a longer time working at current state agency. For men, 
the length of time employed in the field of emergency management was also moderately 
correlated with length of time working at current state agency (r=.569, n=110, p<.000).  
Significant correlations were found at the 0.01 level between perception of community 
resilience and each of the three variables for network integrity and each of the five indexed 
variables for network resilience. A moderate correlation of .593 was found between community 
resilience and perception of network preparedness to respond collaboratively to an emergency. 
Strong correlations were found between network integrity variables and network resilience 
variables with the strongest between the network resilience measures of robustness and 
resourcefulness at (r=.796, n=151, p<.000).  
The first indicator of the latent construct of network integrity was found to be weakly 
correlated with network integrity indicators 2 and 3, whereas 2 and 3 were found to be 
moderately correlated with each other. Correlation coefficients for the construct of network 
integrity can be found in Appendix G. Confirmatory analysis of the measurement model for 
network integrity in Figure 12 was performed.   
77 
 
Figure 12.  Measurement Model of Perceived Network Integrity 
 
With a χ2 = .000 and Df = 9, no p value could be computed because this is a just-
identified model with no goodness of fit measures provided. This model is a just identified 
model, so it is acceptable as a latent construct of network integrity.  A summary of parameter 
estimates for this model can be found in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Measurement Model of Perceived Network 
Integrity 
   
Unstandardized 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P. 
Standardized 
Estimate 
INTEG_3 <-- Per_NI 1.000    .790 
INTEG_2 <-- Per_NI 1.091 .235 4.549* *** .753 
INTEG_1A <-- Per_NI .093 .022 4.168* *** .466 
*Statistically significant at a level of 0.05 or lower 
 
Upon acceptance of the measurement models, the influence of individual level attributes 
on perception of network resilience was analyzed in a structural equation model. In structural 
equation modeling, explanatory models are developed, tested, and verified or revised in order to 
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better fit the data (Unruh & Wan, 2004). The structural model for individual level attributes 
included one construct (network integrity) and 6 variables; state of employment, length of time 
employed in the emergency management field, length of time employed in current emergency 
management agency, gender, education and perception of community resilience (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13. Proposed Structural Model for Influence of Individual Level Attributes on Perception 
of Network Resilience 
 
The individual level demographic variables of experience, gender, and education were 
not found to be statistically significant predictors of perception of network resilience. Perception 
of community resilience and perception of network integrity, however, were demonstrated to be 
significant predictors of perception of network resilience.  Each change of 1 standard deviation 
in perceived network integrity would increase perception of network resilience by .82. Each 
change of 1 standard deviation in perceived community resilience would, statistically, increase 
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perception of network resilience by .09.  The summary of measurement parameters for this 
model are presented in Table 10.  
 
Table 10. Summary of Parameter Measurements for Proposed Structural Model for Influence of 
Individual Level Attributes on Perception of Network Resilience 
   
Unstandardized 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Perc_NR <--- Perc_NI 2.439 .681 3.579 *** .820 
Perc_NR <--- com_Resi .093 .046 2.036 .042 .094 
Perc_NR <--- State_ID -.003 .005 -.518 .604 -.023 
Perc_NR <--- YRS_Work .019 .010 1.946 .052 .107 
Perc_NR <--- YRS_Ag -.008 .015 -.576 .565 -.030 
Perc_NR <--- EDUC -.020 .057 -.342 .732 -.015 
Perc_NR <--- Gender -.324 .184 -1.761 .078 -.081 
Red_I <--- Perc_NR 1.000    .457 
Relat_I <--- Perc_NR 2.248 .385 5.833 *** .860 
Resou_I <--- Perc_NR 2.308 .390 5.911 *** .895 
Rapid_I <--- Perc_NR 1.711 .296 5.785 *** .829 
INTEG_2 <--- Perc_NI 2.665 .797 3.345 *** .822 
INTEG_3 <--- Perc_NI 2.908 .843 3.450 *** 1.026 
INTEG_1A <--- Perc_NI 1.000    .330 
Robust_I <--- Perc_NR 1.431 .245 5.852 *** .857 
 
For this model, a χ2 = 186.728 with 73df, p=.201and χ2/df = 2.558 did not indicate a 
significant model fit, which suggests that the proposed model is inconsistent with observed data. 
Goodness-of-fit indices support that analysis with a CFI=.875, TLI=.820, and RMSEA=.102. 
Additional model trimming was performed.  
Additional model trimming resulted in a structural model for individual level variables 
with an acceptable fit that included only perception of community resilience and perception of 
network integrity and a measurement model revision with the removal of the index for 
robustness (see Figure 14). 
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Figure 14. Final Structural Model for Influence of Individual Level Attributes on Perceived 
Network Resilience 
 
For this model, a χ2 = 21.185 with 17df, p=.350and χ2/df = 1.246 did indicate a very good 
model fit, which suggests that the proposed model is consistent with observed data. Goodness-
of-fit indices support that analysis with a CFI=.998, TLI=.995, and RMSEA=.027. A summary 




Table 11. Summary of Parameter Estimates for Final Structural Model for Influence of 
Individual Level Attributes on Perceived Network Resilience 
   
Unstandardized 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Perc_NR <--- Perc_NI 5.390 1.259 4.282 *** .856 
Perc_NR <--- COM_RESI .171 .094 2.217 .046 .082 
Red_I <--- Perc_NR .498 .083 5.993 *** .486 
Resou_I <--- Perc_NR 1.045 .084 12.391 *** .861 
Rapid_I <--- Perc_NR .834 .067 12.444 *** .862 
INTEG_2 <--- Perc_NI 2.656 .782 3.398 *** .823 
INTEG_3 <--- Perc_NI 2.872 .820 3.503 *** 1.019 
INTEG_1A <--- Perc_NI 1.000    .332 
Relat_I <--- Perc_NR 1.000    .812 
 
Although five of the original seven proposed individual level indicator variables were not 
found to have a significant influence on perception of network resilience, the remaining two 
indicators were found to have a significant influence on perception of network resilience 
although perception of network integrity demonstrated a much strongest influence than 
perception of community resilience. Consequently, hypothesis two, that specific individual level 
indicators can predict perception of emergency management network resilience, is accepted. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3: Specific state level indicators can predict perception of emergency 
management network resilience. 
State level variables include disaster history, state emergency management budget, full 
time emergency management employees, state well-being, and FEMA region. According to 
FEMA data, there were 861 major presidential disaster declarations and 202 emergency 
presidential disaster declarations between 1995 and 2010. The average number of major 
declarations per state in that 15 year period was 17, with a range of 4 to 34. The average number 
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of emergency declarations in that same period was 4, with just 1 state seeing no emergency 
declarations and the rest reporting a range of 1 to 14. The distribution of declarations is 
illustrated in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Major and Emergency Presidential Disaster Declarations in the United States, 1995 
through 2010 
Major Disaster Declarations (1995-2010) 
Number of MDD Number of States 
21-34 20 states  
10-20 15 states  
4-9 16 states 
Emergency Disaster Declarations (1995-2010) 
Number of EDD Number of States 
10-14 5 states 
5-9 11 states 
1-4 34 states 
0 1 state 
 
Among the 47 states represented in survey responses, the minimum State emergency 
budget reported to NEMA (2010) was $497,654. The maximum budget reported was 
$50,707,629 with a mean state emergency management budget of $675,938. The NEMA data 
accessed for this study illustrated that, on average, state emergency management agency budgets 
amount to approximately $1.52 per state citizen, with a range $0.12 to $12.94. Of note, only one 
state demonstrates spending above $5.10 per citizen.  
States reported a minimum of 19 full time employees in their state emergency 
management agencies with a maximum of 518 employees. When taken as a ratio of full time 
employees to population, the state with the smallest ratio reports one full time employee for 
every 9,226 state residents. At the other end of the continuum, one state reports one full time 
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employee for every 124,114 residents. Taken as an employee to budget ratio, the smallest ratio 
reported by one state is one full time employee for every $9,155 of the emergency management 
budget. The largest ratio reported is one employee for every $332,010 of the state’s emergency 
management budget. Mean for this ratio was $59,622 for every one state employee with a 
standard deviation of $55,027. 
State well-being data from the Social Vulnerability Index and American Human 
Development Index were evaluated.  Higher social vulnerability scores reflect a lower level of 
well-being and higher risk of experiencing a negative impact from disaster. Social vulnerability 
index scores ranged from 3.27 to -3.65 with a standard deviation of 1.59 for the 47 states 
represented by participant survey responses. The mean SoVI score was -.4240, near the median 
of -.5400. The smallest of multiple modes for SoVi was 0.58.   
In contrast, higher American Human Development Index (HDI) scores reflect higher 
level of well-being. Lower scores reveal an increased risk of experiencing negative disaster 
related impacts. HDI scores ranged from 3.85 to 6.30 with a standard deviation of .637, a mean 
of 5.05, median of 5.03, and lowest of multiple modes of 5.53.  
Among state level variables, statistically significant relationships included a weak 
negative correlation between Human Development Index (HDI) score and major presidential 
disaster declarations (MDD) (r = -.389, n=47, p<.005), with higher HDI scores associated with 
fewer major disaster declarations. HDI was also found to be moderately negatively associated 
with Social Vulnerability Index (r= -.589, n=47, p<.000), with higher development index scores 
associated with lower vulnerability scores. This negative correlation is expected given the 
inverse scales utilized with the HDI and SoVI. 
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Correlation results for state level variables is displayed in Appendix H. State population 
was moderately associated with emergency presidential disaster declarations (r=.409, n=51, 
p<.003), strongly associated with state emergency management budget (r=.666, n=51, p<.000) 
but not with budget per person, and very strongly associated with number of full time state 
emergency management employees (r=.833, n=51, p<.000). State EM budget was also strongly 
associated with number of full time state emergency management employees (r=.586, n=51, 
p<.000). Increased emergency presidential disaster declarations (ED) were also moderately 
associated with the number of full time emergency management employees in a state (r=.416, 
n=51, p<.003). These results suggest that states with larger populations have more emergency 
presidential disaster declarations, and, probably as a result, more full time EM employees and a 
higher state EM budget.  
State-Level Predictors Model 
The influence of state level attributes on perception of network resilience was analyzed in 
a structural equation model (Figure 15). The analytical model for state level attributes included 
four exogenous variables of state population, state budget for emergency management, number 
of full time state employees, and FEMA region. Two latent variables for disaster history and 
state well-being were also included.  
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Figure 15. Proposed Structural Model for Influence of State Level Attributes on Perceived 
Network Resilience 
 
A summary of measurement parameters for the proposed structural model of state level 
indicators is in Table 13.  For this model, a χ2 = 114.48 with 43df, p=.091 and χ2/df = 2.66 shows 
an acceptable fit, which suggests that the proposed model is consistent with observed data. 




Table 13. Summary of Parameter Estimates for Proposed Structural Model for Influence of State 
Level Attributes on Perceived Network Resilience 
   
Unstandardized 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Perc_NR <--- BUDGET .000 .000 -.885 .376 -.111 
Perc_NR <--- FTEmploy .008 .006 3.465 *** .182 
Perc_NR <--- FEMA_RE -.173 .208 -.833 .405 -.105 
Perc_NR <--- Popul .000 .000 1.563 .118 .194 
Perc_NR <--- HDI -1.979 .877 -2.257 *** -.274 
Perc_NR <--- MDD -.080 .069 -3.156 *** -.144 
Relat_I <--- Perc_NR 1.000    .924 
Resou_I <--- Perc_NR 1.003 .071 14.113 *** .937 
Rapid_I <--- Perc_NR .675 .054 12.558 *** .795 
Red_I <--- Perc_NR .411 .066 6.181 *** .468 
Robust_I <--- Perc_NR .588 .041 14.204 *** .853 
 
 The predictor variables of state budget, state population and FEMA region were not 
found to have any statistically significant influence on perception of network resilience. Model 
adjustments were made to achieve the final structural model for state level attributes that 




Figure 16. Final Structural Model for Influence of State Level Attributes on Perceived Network 
Resilience 
 
Noteworthy features of this model include the negative relationships between perception 
of disaster resilience and both state well-being and disaster experience and the positive 
relationship between number of full time emergency management employees and perception of 
network resilience as illustrated by the statistically significant standardized regression 
coefficients. A summary of measurement parameters for the final structural model of state level 
indicators is in Table 14. The standardized coefficients reveal the strongest relationship between 
state well-being and perception of network resilience. Due to a previous data transformation of 
the indicator for state well-being (Human Development Index), this relationship is not actually 
negative and should be interpreted to suggest that the better a state’s well-being, the more 
resilient a state emergency management network is perceived to be. In contrast, results suggest 






Table 14. Summary of Parameter Measurements for Final Structural Model for Influence of State 
Level Attributes on Perceived Network Resilience 
   
Unstandardized 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Perc_NR <--- FTEmploy .013 .005 2.309 *** .284 
Perc_NR <--- HDI -1.842 .894 -2.061 *** -.255 
Perc_NR <--- MDD -.071 .070 -3.013 *** -.129 
Relat_I <--- Perc_NR 1.000    .925 
Resou_I <--- Perc_NR 1.002 .071 14.084 *** .937 
Rapid_I <--- Perc_NR .674 .054 12.507 *** .793 
Red_I <--- Perc_NR .410 .066 6.167 *** .467 
Robust_I <--- Perc_NR .586 .041 14.148 *** .851 
 
Although three of the original six proposed indicator variables were not found to have a 
significant influence on perception of network resilience, the remaining three indicators were 
found to have a significant influence on perception network resilience. Consequently, hypothesis 
three, that specific state level indicators can predict perception of emergency management 
network resilience, is accepted. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4: State level variables are more influential than individual level variables in 
explaining the variability in perceived emergency network resilience. 
A structural model was tested to explore relationships between the individual and state 
level attributes previously identified as having a significant influence on perception of network 






Figure 17. Final Structural Model for Two Levels of Attributes on Perception of Network 
Resilience 
 
In this model, the attribute with the strongest influence on perception of network 
resilience is perception of network integrity. Additional statistically significant relationships in 
this model include state well-being, major disasters, number of full time state employees and 
perception of community resilience.  A summary of measurement parameters for this final 
structural model with two levels of indicators is in Table 15.  
For this model, a χ2 = 79.08 with 41df, p=.179 and χ2/df = 1.949 did indicate a very good 
model fit, which suggests that the proposed model is consistent with observed data. Goodness-
of-fit indices support that analysis with a CFI=.950, TLI=.920, and RMSEA=.049.  
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Table 15. Summary of Parameter Measurements for Final Two-Level Structural Equation Model 
   
Unstandardized 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Perc_NR <--- MDD .012 .037 2.330 *** .025 
Perc_NR <--- Perc_NI 5.553 1.288 4.312 *** .834 
Perc_NR <--- FTEmploy -.003 .003 -2.892 *** -.066 
Perc_NR <--- HDI -.548 .479 -3.145 *** -.084 
Perc_NR <--- Com_RESI .165 .099 6.669 *** .074 
Relat_I <--- Perc_NR 1.000    .861 
Resou_I <--- Perc_NR 1.027 .077 13.334 *** .896 
Rapid_I <--- Perc_NR .760 .059 12.878 *** .829 
Red_I <--- Perc_NR .449 .076 5.940 *** .465 
Robust_I <--- Perc_NR .637 .047 13.685 *** .859 
INTEG_2 <--- Perc_NI 2.603 .764 3.407 *** .811 
INTEG_3 <--- Perc_NI 2.850 .810 3.521 *** 1.016 
INTEG_1A <--- Perc_NI 1.000    .334 
 
Perception of network integrity demonstrates the strongest relationship with perception of 
network resilience with a standardized estimate of .834, indicating that for every one unit of 
increase in perception of network resilience, perception of network integrity increases by .834, as 
demonstrated in Figure 17. Other attributes demonstrated weaker influence on perception of 
network resilience, with perception of community resilience explaining the most remaining 
variance in perception of network resilience at 27% as illustrated in Table 16. 
 









As perception of network integrity is an individual level attribute, the hypothesis that 
state level variables are more influential than individual level variables in explaining the 
variability in perceived emergency network resilience is not supported by the data. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
This research attempted to identify attributes that influence state emergency management 
network resilience. Three of the four research hypotheses were supported. 
This chapter presents a summary of study findings in Table 17. Theoretical, 
methodological, practical and policy implications of the study are discussed. Limitations and 
significant contributions are summarized. Finally, suggestions for future research and 




Table 17. Findings from Results Testing of Study Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Proposed Predictor 
Variables 
Significant Variables 
H1: Network resilience is 
validly measured by the 
constructs of redundancy, 
rapidity, resourcefulness, 
robustness, and relationships. 
1. Rapidity Indicators 
2. Redundancy Indicators 
3. Relationship Indicators 
4. Resourcefulness Indicators 
5. Robustness Indicators 
1. Rapidity Index 
2. Redundancy Index 
3. Relationship Index 
4. Resourcefulness Index 
5. Robustness Index 
H2: Specific individual level 
indicators can predict 
perception of emergency 
management network 
resilience. 
1. Years employed in 
Emergency Management 
2. Years employed at current 
state agency 
3. Gender 
4. Educational Attainment 
5. Perception of Network 
Integrity 
6. Perception of Community 
Resilience 
1. Perception of Network 
Integrity 
2. Perception of Community 
Resilience   
H3: Specific state level 
indicators can predict 
perception of emergency 
management network 
resilience. 
1. State Disaster Experience 
2. State Well-Being 
3. State Emergency 
Management Budget 
4. State Population 
5. Full-time State Emergency 
Management Employees 
6. FEMA Region  
1. State Disaster Experience 
2. State Well-Being 
3. Full-time State Emergency 
Management Employees 
H4: State-level variables are 
more influential than 
individual-level variables in 
explaining the variability in 
perceived emergency network 
resilience 
1. Years employed in 
Emergency Management 
2. Years employed at current 
state agency 
3. Gender 
4. Educational Attainment 
5. Perception of Network 
Integrity 
6. Perception of Community 
Resilience 
7. State Disaster Experience 
8. State Well-Being 
9. State Emergency 
Management Budget 
10. State Population 
11. Full-time State Emergency 
Management Employees 
12. FEMA Region 
1. Perception of Network 
Integrity 
2. Perception of Community 
Resilience   
3. State Disaster Experience 
4. State Well-Being 





Hypothesis 1 stated: Network resilience is validly measured by the constructs of 
redundancy, rapidity, resourcefulness, robustness, and relationships. 
The measurement model for network resilience included five constructs conceptualized to 
reflect the capacity of a network of emergency management partners to support exchange of 
resources and information. The model was found to be valid, with, in descending strength, the 
constructs of resourcefulness, relationships, robustness, rapidity, and redundancy validly and 
reliably measuring perception of network resilience so this hypothesis was accepted. 
With a valid measurement model, two levels of attributes believed to influence 
perception of network resilience were identified.  
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 stated: Specific individual level indicators can predict perception of 
emergency management network resilience. 
Two individual level attributes demonstrated a statistically significant influence on 
perception of network resilience; perception of community resilience and perception of network 
integrity, so Hypothesis 2 was accepted. Variables in the latent construct of network integrity 
were identified by the researcher based on the theoretical frameworks guiding the study. The 
measurement model for perception of network integrity was also determined to be valid, 
suggesting that measures of community insulation, distributional equity of decision making 
power, and preparedness to collaborate can be considered measures of network integrity. 
Perception of network integrity demonstrated a stronger relationship with perception of network 
resilience than did perception of community resilience, perhaps in part because respondents held 
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a range of definitions of community resilience despite being given a specific definition to 
consider. The three variables in the construct of network integrity were less conceptually abstract 
than community resilience, which may also have influenced respondent perceptions.    
Qualitative responses indicated many different perceptions of community resilience 
regardless of that definition, so results may have been influenced if participants considered a 
different definition of community resilience when responding. This possibility is reinforced by 
the lack of correlation in this study between respondent perception of community resilience in 
their home state and both the HDI and SoVI, two indicators of state well-being.  
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 stated: Specific state level indicators can predict perception of emergency 
management network resilience. 
Three state level attributes were found to be statistically significant predictors of 
perception of network resilience so Hypothesis 3 was accepted. Two of those, number of full 
time employees and disaster experience, may influence the frequency and breadth of 
opportunities for network partners to participate in resource and information exchange. The 
number of full time employees was found to weakly influence perception of network resilience, 
perhaps because the more employees a state emergency management agency has, the fewer 
relationships with other entities each might develop as job duties are spread across more staff. 
This importance of this finding is reinforced by proceedings of a 2014 workshop series on 
regional disaster response coordination to support health outcomes convened by the Institute of 
Medicine. A summary of expert attendee opinions suggests that the most significant challenge to 
cross-sector collaboration during disaster is sustainability of collaborations during “peace time” 
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(Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2015b).  Federal funding decreases have left public agencies with 
fewer staff to maintain public-private partnerships.  Disaster experience was found to weakly 
influence perception of network resilience perhaps in part because measurement for that 
construct is only based on one indicator, major presidential disaster declarations. This type of 
disaster declaration is based on estimated economic loss, so a disaster with very high economic 
impact over a short time period and requiring few resources may qualify, even if there is not a 
correlated large scale network response with extended need for resource and information 
exchange.  
The third state-level attribute, state well-being, was weakly related, suggesting that 
changes in state well-being have slight influence on perception of network resilience. While the 
theoretical framework for this study supported overall community well-being as a predictor of 
resilience, there may not be a direct relationship between community resilience and network 
resilience.  
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 stated: State-level variables are more influential than individual-level 
variables in explaining the variability in perceived emergency network resilience. 
State level attributes were in fact found to have less influence on perception of network 
resilience than either of the two statistically significant individual level variables, perception of 
network integrity and perception of community resilience. Hypothesis 4 is not accepted.  
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Implications of the Study 
Theoretical Implications 
This research supports the premise that state emergency management networks can be 
viewed as both communities and complex adaptive systems and as such, can experience 
improved resilience when developed according to those respective states. The valid addition of 
relationships as a fifth construct to the MCEER 4 R’s of Resiliency scale may warrant further 
investigation for network level study.  The influence of network integrity on network resilience 
illustrated in this study may suggest there is value in consideration of network integrity as an 
antecedent to network resilience. The construct of network integrity, as conceptualized in this 
study, reflects a measure of current readiness to collaborate and two measures of a structural 
framework to guide collaboration.  Finally, this study is evidence that continued research efforts 
to define resilience in the context of networks, communities, and vulnerability are necessary.  
Methodological Implications 
This study reinforces the need to collect better data at the state level. Common measures 
of state well-being are very difficult to compare due to sample and analysis constraints.  It also 
illustrates the challenges inherent to relying on one network entity to provide data about 
perceptions of resilience across the entire network. Obtaining an adequate sample size was 
difficult despite drawing from one of the few entities that participates in every state emergency 
management network. While more diverse perspectives could provide a more comprehensive 
perspective on network resilience, sample identification and data collection would be 
cumbersome. The construct for network integrity could be evaluated as a state level attribute if 
appropriate measures for the indicators could be identified. 
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Practical Implications 
The identification of attributes that influence emergency management network resilience 
could have tremendous impact on the ability of state emergency management agencies to guide 
their own networks to perform more vigorous resilience assessments. The clear relationship 
between perception of network integrity and perception of network resilience suggests that 
networks should work to improve their integrity by increasing communication and relationship 
building with local entities to decrease their insulation from communities. They should also 
ensure that economic and policy decision making power is equitably distributed across the 
network and test preparedness to mount a collaborative response.  
Networks that work to improve perception of network integrity should find agency 
employees reporting increased perception of network resilience, reflecting an increased trust in 
exchange relationships. Indirect but still practical benefits may include less uncertainty and 
decreased employee/participant stress during an actual disaster/emergency if their state network 
responds more efficiently and/or effectively as a result of improved preparation and network 
development. The lack of variability in the state-level predictors in this study contributes to the 
weaker explanatory power in the prediction of perceived emergency network resiliency. 
Policy Implications 
Several policy implications arise from this study. Most significant relates to the finding 
that perception of network integrity has a significant and strong influence on perception of 
network resilience. Policy makers and funding entities should encourage and fund network 
resilience building activities that reflect a commitment to build network integrity. Network 
integrity could be considered evidence of a robust complex adaptive system, one that can affect 
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the necessary structural adaptation to improve efficiency and effectiveness during disaster 
response. 
While number of full time employees is weakly associated with increased perception of 
network resilience, study findings do not have adequate strength to support adjustment of 
staffing models as a technique to improve perception of network resilience. Similarly, state well-
being is a dynamic and fluid construct. Although the relationship between state well-being and 
perception of network resilience is weak, it is still significant. Entities involved in developing 
community well-being can rest assured their work will continue to inform network resilience.   
Finally, given the weak but significant relationship between disaster history and 
perception of community resilience, state emergency management agency representatives and 
federal partners may consider emphasizing the value of after-action reports and corrective action 
plans to increase the chance networks will identify opportunities to develop relationships of 
resource and information exchange. 
Limitations of the Study 
Several study limitations should be noted. One limitation of this study was consideration 
of only employees from each state emergency management agency to participate in a survey 
designed to assess network relationships between a number of different entities. It is possible that 
state emergency management agency employees may have some inherent bias related to the 
relative position of their agency in most networks or they may have limited or inaccurate 
information relative to the real levels of involvement, functions or capacities of other agencies.  
Another limitation was the irregular representation of states in the study sample. The 
sampling goal was to have a minimum of four surveys from each state to ensure adequate 
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comparability. In fact, more than four surveys were received from only 17 states. It is possible 
that this variability could weight responses at the individual attribute level if same-state 
respondents shared common perceptions due to variables not measured by this study. No 
significant differences were seen in results when controlling for state but the sample 
inconsistency may have diminished the power of the statistical tests to identify any difference. 
For this reason, state averages for individual level attributes were also not reported. 
This research surveyed employee perception at just one point in time without regard to 
current disaster response status, another limitation of the study. Although some respondents 
reported being in the middle of response activity during survey participation, the presence or 
absence of an emergency state was not collected. It is possible that perception of network 
resilience is not only influenced by disaster history, as conceptualized, but also by current 
disaster status. A comparison of perception of network resilience during both disaster and non-
disaster times would address this limitation.   
Finally, it is important to note that while findings are reflective of a sample drawn from 
47 states, results should not be considered generalizable without additional analysis of state-
specific network structure, resources, priorities and experience. Significant structural differences 
in state governance, budget strategy, emergency management agency administrative structure 
and culture, and types of agencies and organizations that populate each state emergency 
management network were not evaluated so limited direct comparison can be made. 
Contributions of the Study 
This study demonstrated a valid measurement model for perception of network resilience. 
It also identified attributes at the state and individual level that influence perception of network 
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resilience. As an indicator of capacity to adapt to the negative impacts of disaster and recover 
services and support to baseline pre-event levels, network resilience is a valuable measure. 
LaFond, Brown, and Macintyre suggest that achieving better [health] outcomes requires both 
increased financial investment and adequate local capacity to use resources effectively (2002).  
This study is positioned to contribute to the body of knowledge that guides policy development, 
investment and resource allocation to build emergency management network resilience. Study 
findings reinforce the premise that there are structural and organizational characteristics of 
networks, identified here as network integrity, that can be developed to increase perception of 
network resilience. Identification of state attributes that also influence network resilience like 
disaster experience, number of full time employees, and state well-being can reinforce the value 
of increased investment in network development activity across all four of the emergency 
management cycles of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.  
Recommendations 
A number of recommendations for future research arose from this study. One of the more 
significant would be network analysis of multiple state emergency management networks to 
determine if perception of network resilience is related to specific network analysis measures 
like centrality or cliques and if so, if network maps might be an acceptable proxy for network 
resilience. A follow-on study to that would be longitudinal network analysis to determine if 
network entities change position and roles to exchange resources and information differently 
during a disaster than they do when there is not an event and if so, how.  Those organic strategies 
that networks develop to function during periods of stress may be innovative best practices worth 
replicating or they may have a negative impact on network integrity and ultimately, resilience.  
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Simulation could be a solution to the current organizational and management challenges inherent 
in static network analysis. Replication of network relationships and attributes that influence them 
could allow model simulation to further explore how network development activities may 
influence network form, function, integrity and resilience. Comparison of common attributes of 
network resilience across state emergency management networks during different phases of 
network development may expand understanding of and of different types of networks.  
If states with more disaster experience do in fact demonstrate more resilient emergency 
management networks, a logical next step would be a network analysis of all state emergency 
management networks in an effort to determine what similarities in network structure might be 
present among more disaster experienced networks  and/or lacking in those networks with less 
experience so that purposeful network development can be undertaken to adapt the network 
structure to better resemble that of a more resilient network.   
Conclusion 
When any relationship includes the exchange of resources or information, trust is 
generated. When networked actors participate in that exchange, that trust is perceived as network 
resilience. Study results support the premise that network resilience can be increased by 
development of a network framework that supports exchange of resources and information 
within those relationships. That framework, conceptualized in this study as network integrity, 
encourages equitable distribution of decision making power, increased readiness to collaborate 
and decreased insulation from communities as important indicators of perception of network 
resilience. State emergency management agencies are strongly anchored institutions in each state 
emergency management network. This position allows a more loosely structured and flexible 
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network to develop around them (National Academies, 2013). That flexibility, once again, 
contributes to both the adaptability and sustainability of the network, both important attributes of 
a functional emergency management network with the capacity to influence disaster impacts.   
Increased network resilience means the network’s capacity to facilitate resource and 
information exchange during emergencies is less vulnerable to disruption and failure. A 
community’s resilience to disaster depends in part on the resilience of the network that is 
charged with leading disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery efforts. As both 
the first responders, and sometimes the only responders, with the tools and technical expertise to 
support disaster victims, emergency management networks should do all they can to maintain 
their network’s integrity during non-disaster periods to improve their resilience, protect their 
capacity to function during disaster and contribute to community resilience.  
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APPENDIX B: PERCEPTION OF NETWORK RESILIENCE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
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Construct: Robustness            
  Not Very                 Somewhat                    Very 
       Connected             Connected               Connected  
        1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9         
 
RO_1: How connected do you think member organizations are with each other within your state 
emergency management (EM) network? 
 
RO_4: How connected do you think your state (EM) agency is with other member organizations in your 
state (EM) network? 
 
                    Subtract       Subtract      Do   Add          Add  
         Many          Some    Nothing    Some        Many __  
        1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9         
 
RO_2: Please indicate how you would adjust the number of member agencies/organizations in your state 
(EM) network to make your network as strong as possible. 
 
  Lowest                     Moderate               Highest  
         Level                Level               Level_ 
          1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8      9     
 
RO_3:  At which level of stress do you believe your state (EM) network would begin to suffer a loss of 
performance and function? 
 
Construct: Resourcefulness           
 
 Not Confident            Somewhat                      Very  
             At All              Confident                   Confident  
           1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9       
 
RE_4: How confident are you in the ability of member organizations in your state (EM) network to 
identify and address collective problems related to (EM)?     
 
RE_1: How confident are you in the ability of member organizations in your state (EM) network to 
establish collaborative (EM) priorities?    
 
RE_2: How confident are you in the ability of member organizations in your state (EM) network to 
mobilize (EM) resources like personnel, equipment, and information?     
 
RE_3: How confident are you in the ability of the member organizations in your state (EM) network to 




Construct: Redundancy           
  
   Not At All                Somewhat                     Very  
             Likely                Likely                 Likely  
      1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9            
 
RD_2: What is the likelihood that at least one other member organization in your state (EM) network 
could perform the work of another member organization if that original organization fails when there is 
no emergency?  
 
RD_5: What is the likelihood that at least one other member organization in your state (EM) network 
could perform the work of another member organization if that original organization fails during an 
emergency response?  
 
 Not At All                Somewhat                   Very  
          Often                        Often                   Often  
        1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9    
 
RD_1: How often do two or more member organizations in your state (EM) network perform the same 
role or function during an emergency response?  
 
RD_3: How often do two or more member organizations in your state (EM) network perform the same 
role or function when there is no emergency?  
 
RD_4: How often do member organizations in your state (EM) network share resources like personnel, 
equipment or supplies during an emergency response?  
 
RD_6: How often do member organizations in your state (EM) network share resources like personnel, 
equipment or supplies when there is no emergency? 
 
Construct: Rapidity            
 
Not At All                  Somewhat                     Very  
         Quickly           Quickly                    Quickly  
    1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9         
 
RA-1:  During an emergency, how quickly can you expect MOST organizations in your state (EM) 
network to respond to any request from your agency? 
 
RA-2:  During an emergency, how quickly can you expect MOST organizations in your state (EM) 
network to mobilize and fulfill their responsibilities?                      
 
RA-3: When there is no emergency, how quickly can you expect MOST organizations in your state (EM) 
network to mobilize and fulfill their responsibilities? 
 
RA-4: When there is no emergency, how quickly can you expect MOST organizations in your state (EM) 
network to respond to any request from your agency? 
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Construct: Relationships            
 
   Not At All                  Somewhat             Very  
            Strong                Strong                Strong  
                         1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9        
 
FEMA_FED: How would you describe the strength of the relationship between your state (EM) agency 
and the federal FEMA office? 
 
FEMA_ST: How would you describe the strength of the relationship between your state (EM) agency and 
your regional FEMA office? 
 
INTER_ST: How would you describe the strength of the relationship between your state (EM) agency 
and (EM) agencies in other states? 
 
NETWORK: How would you describe the strength of the emergency management network in your state? 
 
LOCAL: How would you describe the strength of relationships between your state (EM) agency and local 
governments in your state? 
 
STATE: How would you describe the strength of relationships between your state (EM) agency and other 
agencies in your state (EM) network? 
 
Construct: Network Integrity           
 
   Not At All                Somewhat                      Very  
           Insulated           Insulated                    Insulated  
            1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9         
 
Integ_1:  How insulated do you thing members of your entire state (EM) network are from the 
communities they serve? 
 
    Not At All                Somewhat                     Very  
             Fairly               Fairly                         Fairly  
            1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9         
 
Integ_2: Consider the entire network of emergency management actors in your state; how fairly 
and equitably is the power to make economic and policy decisions distributed across that 
network?? 
 
    Not Well                   Somewhat                Very Well 
           Prepared         Well Prepared                Prepared  
            1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9         
 
Integ_3: How well prepared do you think the entire emergency management network in your 




Community Resilience            
 
Please consider the following definition of community resilience:             
 
Community resilience is the ability of a community to respond with strength in the face of 
adversity, and in so doing reach a higher level of function in recovery. 
  
    Not At All                Somewhat                      Very  
           Resilient             Resilient                    Resilient  
            1       2        3        4       5        6        7        8        9         
 
21. When applying the definition of community resilience given above, how resilient do you think 
the communities in your home state are to disaster today?
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      QFHH 0.863 
      QBLACK 0.752     
Race (Black) and 
Class (Poverty) 
 QPOVTY 0.715 
1 + 16.599 QNOAUTO 0.615 
     QCVLUN 0.612 
      QED12LES 0.547 
      QFAM ‐0.837 
      MEHSEVAL 0.891       QRICH200K 0.854 
2 ‐ Wealth 15.905 MDGRENT 0.85 
      PERCAP 0.805 
      QASIAN 0.681 
      MEDAGE 0.889 
      QAGEDEP 0.767 
3 + Age (Old) 13.196 QSSBEN 0.763 
      QUNOCCHU 0.718 
      PPUNIT ‐0.596 
      QRENTER ‐0.669 
      QNOHLTH 0.744       QHISP 0.725 
4 + Ethnicity (Hispanic) 9.479 QEXTRCT 0.545 
      QED12LES 0.532 
      QFEMLBR ‐0.621 
5 + Nursing Home Residents 7.471 
QNRRES 0.666 
HOSPTPC 0.643 





7 + Employment in Service Industries 4.809 
QSERV 0.739 
QFHH ‐0.660 
  Cumulative Variance Explained     72.501 
Notes: 
- Component scores/composite SoVI scores are relative and comparable across the 
U.S.    
- The SoVI composite score is obtained by summing all component scores. 
Source: Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute @ University of South Carolina 
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State HDI HDI_I* SoVI 
Alabama 4.09 -2.21 -0.72657351 
Alaska 5.27 -1.03 2.02013745 
Arizona 5.11 -1.19 1.69310173 
Arkansas 3.87 -2.43 0.71847649 
California 5.56 -0.74 -1.30347271 
Colorado 5.65 -0.65 -0.64848181 
Connecticut 6.30 0.00 -3.64616475 
Delaware 5.33 -0.97 -2.61936400 
Florida 5.07 -1.23 0.53623704 
Georgia 4.86 -1.44 -0.52423931 
Hawaii 5.73 -0.57 -1.09131960 
Idaho 4.65 -1.65 -0.54086464 
Illinois 5.39 -0.91 -0.61278150 
Indiana 4.74 -1.56 -1.40057096 
Iowa 5.06 -1.24 0.23639557 
Kansas 5.06 -1.24 0.53776021 
Kentucky 4.23 -2.07 0.10337505 
Louisiana 4.07 -2.23 0.39679835 
Maine 4.89 -1.41 -0.57687244 
Maryland 5.96 -0.34 -3.42236483 
Massachusetts 6.24 -0.06 -3.15886950 
Michigan 4.99 -1.31 0.27300664 
Minnesota 5.74 -0.56 -0.54273141 
Mississippi 3.93 -2.37 0.28741946 
Missouri 4.68 -1.62 0.40095794 
Montana 4.49 -1.81 3.26584539 
Nebraska 5.05 -1.25 1.78118365 
Nevada 4.78 -1.52 0.78927006 
New Hampshire 5.73 -0.57 -2.50358260 
New Jersey 6.16 -0.14 -3.49600519 
New Mexico 4.56 -1.74 2.61670209 
New York 5.77 -0.53 -0.55946656 
North Carolina 4.64 -1.66 -0.62231848 
North Dakota 4.92 -1.38 1.50421147 
Ohio 4.87 -1.43 -1.11041284 
Oklahoma 4.15 -2.15 1.26132675 
Oregon 5.03 -1.27 0.30926758 
Pennsylvania 5.12 -1.18 -0.78455407 
Rhode Island 5.56 -0.74 -2.83654080 
South Carolina 4.36 -1.94 -0.50670380 
South Dakota 4.82 -1.48 1.92910511 
Tennessee 4.33 -1.97 -0.51844360 
Texas 4.67 -1.63 1.14287723 
Utah 5.08 -1.22 -2.26286448 
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Vermont 5.27 -1.03 -1.90703857 
Virginia 5.53 -0.77 -1.40598119 
Washington 5.53 -0.77 -0.58136141 
Washington D.C. 6.21 -0.09 -0.25735300 
West Virginia 3.85 -2.45 1.16275324 
Wisconsin 5.23 -1.07 -1.15976256 
Wyoming 4.80 -1.50 -0.92658539 
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 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
State_ID 151 50 1 51 26.85 14.668 
YRS_Work 151 45 1 45 13.21 9.945 
YRS_Ag 151 33 1 33 8.58 6.442 
Gender 151 1 1 1 .73 .446 
Educ 151 6 1 7 3.77 1.378 
RO_1 151 8 1 9 6.52 1.754 
RO_2 151 6 1 7 3.56 .861 
RO_3 151 8 1 9 6.91 1.930 
RO_4 151 8 1 9 7.13 1.656 
NETWORK 151 7 2 9 6.90 1.708 
STATE 151 8 1 9 6.97 1.627 
FEMA_DIS 151 8 1 9 7.27 1.751 
FEMA_FED 151 8 1 9 6.14 2.139 
INTER_ST 151 8 1 9 6.12 1.811 
LOCAL 151 8 1 9 6.77 1.577 
RA_1 151 7 2 9 7.38 1.632 
RA_2 151 7 2 9 7.23 1.497 
RA_3 151 8 1 9 6.09 1.826 
RA_4 151 8 1 9 5.94 1.650 
RD_1 151 8 1 9 4.25 2.027 
RD_2 151 8 1 9 5.37 1.975 
RD_3 151 8 1 9 4.07 2.116 
RD_4 151 8 1 9 7.15 1.962 
RD_5 151 8 1 9 6.13 1.760 
RD_6 151 8 1 9 4.79 2.077 
RE_1 151 8 1 9 7.07 1.731 
RE_2 151 8 1 9 7.50 1.632 
RE_3 151 8 1 9 6.92 1.867 
RE_4 151 8 1 9 6.85 1.924 
COM_RESI 151 8 1 9 5.63 1.821 
Integ_1A 151 8 1 8 5.65 1.830 
INTEG_2 151 8 1 9 5.31 1.960 
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Skewedness and Kurtosis of the Perception of Network Resilience Survey Variables  
  YRS_ Work YRS_Ag Gender Educ 
COM_ 
RESI INTEG_1A INTEG_2 INTEG_3 Red_I Relat_I Resou_I Rapid_I Robust_I 
Valid N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Skewedness 0.704 0.629 0.942 0.163 0.088 0.584 -0.219 -0.88 -0.109 -0.776 0.815 -0.732 -0.401 
SE of Skew 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 
z-score 2.37 2.12 3.17 0.55 0.30 1.97 -0.74 -2.96 -0.37 -2.61 2.74 -2.46 -1.35 
Kurtosis 0.521 0.847 -0.936 -0.508 -0.246 0.588 -0.114 0.921 0.169 0.875 0.875 0.394 1.026 
SE of 
Kurtosis 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 
z-score 1.32 2.16 -2.39 -1.3 -.63 1.50 -0.29 2.35 0.43 2.23 2.23 1.01 2.62 
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  YRS_Work YRS_Ag Gender Educ COM_RESI Integ_1A INTEG_2 INTEG_3 Red  _I Relat_I Resou_I Rapid_I Robust_I 
YRS_Wkk Pearson  1 .540** .103 -.081 .007 .127 .015 -.006 -.069 .108 .076 -.003 .065 
Sig. (2-
tailed)   .000 .209 .325 .934 .121 .853 .937 .398 .188 .356 .975 .427 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
YRS_Ag Pearson  .540** 1 -.061 -.052 .070 .116 .111 .035 -.085 .098 .081 -.009 .123 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000   .460 .524 .395 .157 .176 .668 .302 .233 .323 .909 .133 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Gender Pearson  .103 -.061 1 -.038 .089 .136 .113 .048 .067 .017 .015 -.045 -.044 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .209 .460   .643 .279 .097 .169 .562 .413 .834 .855 .582 .594 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Educ Pearson  -.081 -.052 -.038 1 .029 .028 -.022 -.114 .104 -.077 -.082 -.070 -.161* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .325 .524 .643   .721 .730 .784 .162 .202 .348 .315 .390 .049 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
COM_RESI Pearson  .007 .070 .089 .029 1 .309** .490** .593** .386** .501** .529** .512** .504** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .934 .395 .279 .721   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Integ_1A Pearson  .127 .116 .136 .028 .309** 1 .287** .332** .086 .174* .318** .262** .239** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .121 .157 .097 .730 .000   .000 .000 .296 .033 .000 .001 .003 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
INTEG_2 Pearson  .015 .111 .113 -.022 .490** .287** 1 .595** .327** .535** .626** .656** .572** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .853 .176 .169 .784 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
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   YRS_Work YRS_Ag Gender Educ COM_RESI Integ_1A INTEG_2 INTEG_3 Red_I Relat_I Resou_I Rapid_I Robust_I 
INTEG_3 Pearson  -.006 .035 .048 -.114 .593** .332** .595** 1 .424** .723** .777** .768** .729** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .937 .668 .562 .162 .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Red_I Pearson  -.069 -.085 .067 .104 .386** .086 .327** .424** 1 .460** .403** .425** .345** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .398 .302 .413 .202 .000 .296 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Relat_I Pearson  .108 .098 .017 -.077 .501** .174* .535** .723** .460** 1 .724** .725** .781** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .188 .233 .834 .348 .000 .033 .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Resou_I Pearson  .076 .081 .015 -.082 .529** .318** .626** .777** .403** .724** 1 .744** .796** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .356 .323 .855 .315 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Rapid_I Pearson  -.003 -.009 -.045 -.070 .512** .262** .656** .768** .425** .725** .744** 1 .676** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .975 .909 .582 .390 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Robust_I Pearson  .065 .123 -.044 -.161* .504** .239** .572** .729** .345** .781** .796** .676** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .427 .133 .594 .049 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Perception of Network Integrity Correlations 
 Integ_1A INTEG_2 INTEG_3 
Integ_1A Pearson Correlation 1 .287** .332** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 
INTEG_2 Pearson Correlation .287** 1 .595** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 
N 151 151 151 
INTEG_3 Pearson Correlation .332** .595** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
N 151 151 151 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
Perception of Network Resilience Scale Correlations 
 Red_I Relat_I Resou_I Rapid_I Robust_I 
Red_I Pearson Correlation 1 .460** .403** .425** .345** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 
Relat_I Pearson Correlation .460** 1 .724** .725** .781** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 
Resou_I Pearson Correlation .403** .724** 1 .744** .796** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 
Rapid_I Pearson Correlation .425** .725** .744** 1 .676** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 151 151 151 151 151 
Robust_I Pearson Correlation .345** .781** .796** .676** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 151 151 151 151 151 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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State Level Variable Correlations (n=51) 
  HDI MDD ED BUDGET 
FT 
Employ Popul SoVI 
HDI 
Pearson  1 -.389** .224 .176 .178 .140 -.589** 
Sig.   .005 .115 .221 .215 .329 .000 
MDD Pearson  
-.389** 1 .298* .261 .270 .277* .328* 
Sig.  .005   .034 .067 .058 .049 .019 
ED Pearson  
.224 .298* 1 .274 .416** .409** -.102 
Sig.  .115 .034   .054 .003 .003 .475 
BUDGET Pearson  
.176 .261 .274 1 .586** .666** -.129 
Sig.  .221 .067 .054   .000 .000 .373 
FTEmploy Pearson  
.178 .270 .416** .586** 1 .833** -.190 
Sig.  .215 .058 .003 .000   .000 .186 
Popul Pearson  
.140 .277* .409** .666** .833** 1 -.086 
Sig.  .329 .049 .003 .000 .000   .549 
SoVI 
Pearson  -.589** .328* -.102 -.129 -.190 -.086 1 
Sig.  .000 .019 .475 .373 .186 .549   
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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________________________________________________________________                      
Dear State Emergency Management Agency Employee, 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study to learn more about state emergency 
management networks resilience, a key element to the reduction of disaster related economic and 
social costs. Please take a few moments to respond to this important research on state emergency 
management networks and share your perspective. 
 
EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH 
• The PURPOSE of this research is to evaluate the influence of both individual and state attributes 
on your perception of the resilience of your state’s emergency management network. 
• Participation involves your anonymous response to a 33 question online survey. 
• This survey asks your opinion about different aspects of the state emergency management 
network that the agency you work for participates in. You may complete this survey from any 
computer with internet access. 
• This survey is anticipated to take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
• You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. 
 
If you consent to participate, please follow the hyperlink embedded in the Project Title below 
to the survey. Thanks very much! 
 
Project Title: INFLUENCE OF PERSONAL AND STATE LEVEL VARIABLES ON PERCEPTION 
OF STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT NETWORK RESILIENCE IN 47 STATES 
 
Principal Investigator: Victoria Jennison RN, MS 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Thomas Wan  
 
Study contacts for questions about the study, request results, or to report a problem: If you have 
questions, concerns, or complaints Victoria Jennison RN, MS   Doctoral Student, Public Affairs Program, 
College of Health and Public Affairs, (321) 693-3236 or toryjennison@knights.ucf.edu or Dr. Tom Wan, 
Faculty Supervisor, Associate Dean for Research, Professor of Public Affairs 407-823-3678 or by email 
at twan@mail.ucf.edu.  
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:    Research at the University of Central Florida 
involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This 
research has been reviewed and approved by the IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in 
research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.  
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